The DOI matches its Crossref record; 66 of the 66 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non‐deterrent*
Abstract
Law backed by non‐deterrent sanctions (mild law) has been hypothesized to achieve compliance because of norm activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild law in the provision of public goods by comparing it to severe law (deterrent sanctions) and no law. The results show that exogenously imposing mild law does not achieve compliance, but compliance is much improved if mild law is endogenously chosen, i.e., self‐imposed. We show that voting for mild law induces expectations of cooperation, and that people tend to comply with the law if they expect many others to do so.
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Cited by
Alesina, A., & Giuliano, P. (2015) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.53.4.898 · Cited by 1,475
Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?
Bowles, S., & Polanía-Reyes, S. (2012) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.50.2.368 · Cited by 917
Reward, punishment, and cooperation: A meta-analysis.
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Institution Formation in Public Goods Games
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Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy
Bó, P. D., Foster, A., & Putterman, L. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.5.2205 · Cited by 372
Metadata
- Authors
- Tyran, J., & Feld, L. P.
- Venue
- The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-03
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 135-156
- ISSN
- 0347-0520 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9442
- OpenAlex
- W2164552964
- Cited by
- 418
- References
- 66
- FWCI
- 34.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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