The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
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Cites
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Cited by
A Sparsity-Based Model of Bounded Rationality *
Gabaix, X. (2014) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qju024 · Cited by 683
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Li, S. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20160425 · Cited by 439
Gennaioli, N., & Shleifer, A. (2010) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2010.125.4.1399 · Cited by 435
Coarse Thinking and Persuasion*
Mullainathan, S., Schwartzstein, J., & Shleifer, A. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.577 · Cited by 375
Gabaix, X. (2019) · Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 1 · doi:10.1016/bs.hesbe.2018.11.001 · Cited by 329
Kőszegi, B. (2014) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.52.4.1075 · Cited by 317
SELECTIVE ATTENTION AND LEARNING
Schwartzstein, J. (2014) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12104 · Cited by 269
The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights
Bartling, B., Fehr, E., & Herz, H. (2014) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta11573 · Cited by 268
Enke, B. (2020) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjaa012 · Cited by 186
Maximization, learning, and economic behavior
Erev, I., & Roth, A. E. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1402846111 · Cited by 155
Metadata
- Authors
- Jehiel, P.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-08
- Volume
- 123
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 81-104
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2170714771
- Cited by
- 399
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 9.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.