The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
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A Sparsity-Based Model of Bounded Rationality *
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Metadata
- Authors
- Jehiel, P.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-08
- Volume
- 123
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 81-104
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2170714771
- Cited by
- 399
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 9.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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