The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
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Metadata
- Authors
- Blume, A., & Ortmann, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-01
- Volume
- 132
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 274-290
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1973522638
- Cited by
- 317
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 27.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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