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Cited by 279

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

It's What You Say, Not What You Pay: An Experimental Study of Manager-Employee Relationships in Overcoming Coordination Failure

Brandts, Jordi, Cooper, David J.·2007·Journal of the European Economic Association

Abstract

We study manager-employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure. To overcome a history of coordination failure, managers have two instruments at their disposal: increasing employees' financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees. Synthesizing methods drawn from psychology and economics, we quantify the impact of specific types of communication on workers' effort levels and manager's profits. This methodology allows us to rigorously compare the efficacy of communication and direct incentives in an environment where both are available. We find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps. Examining the content of managers' communication, the most effective communication strategy is quite simple: specifically request a high effort, point out the mutual benefits of high effort, and imply that employees are being paid well.

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Crossref · 10.1162/jeea.2007.5.6.1223

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Metadata

Authors
Brandts, J., & Cooper, D. J.
Venue
Journal of the European Economic Association
Published
2007-12-01
Volume
5
Issue
6
Pages
1223-1268
ISSN
  • 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
  • 1542-4774
OpenAlex
W2130988938
Cited by
279
References
37
FWCI
28.87
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: It's What You Say, Not What You Pay: An Experimental Study of Manager-Employee Relationships in Overcoming Coordination Failure. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/jeea.2007.5.6.1223
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Brandts, J., & Cooper, D. J. (2007). It's What You Say, Not What You Pay: An Experimental Study of Manager-Employee Relationships in Overcoming Coordination Failure. Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2007.5.6.1223

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.