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An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation
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Cited by
The impact of environmental, social, and governance disclosure on firm value: The role of CEO power
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Metadata
- Authors
- Goldman, E., & Slezak, S. L.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-06
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 603-626
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121301314
- Cited by
- 466
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 73.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
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