The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting
Abstract
We argue that earnings management and fraudulent accounting have important economic consequences. In a model where the costs of earnings management are endogenous, we show that in equilibrium, low-productivity firms hire and invest too much in order to pool with high productivity firms. This behavior distorts the allocation of economic resources in the economy. We test the predictions of the model using firm-level data. We show that during periods of suspicious accounting, firms hire and invest excessively, while managers exercise options. When the misreporting is detected, firms shed labor and capital and productivity improves. Our firm-level results hold both before and after the market crash of 2000. In the aggregate, our model provides a novel explanation for periods of jobless and investment-less growth.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
By Force of Habit: A Consumption‐Based Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior
Campbell, J. Y., & Cochrane, J. H. (1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250059 · Cited by 5,210
A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting
Healy, P. M., & Wahlen, J. M. (1999) · Accounting Horizons · doi:10.2308/acch.1999.13.4.365 · Cited by 4,623
Risks for the Long Run: A Potential Resolution of Asset Pricing Puzzles
Bansal, R., & Yaron, A. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00670.x · Cited by 4,242
Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior
Stein, J. C. (1989) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937861 · Cited by 2,563
CEO incentives and earnings management
Bergstresser, D. B. (2004) · Cited by 2,392
Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles
Scheinkman, J. A., & Xiong, W. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/378531 · Cited by 2,198
Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals
Agrawal, A., & Chadha, S. (2005) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/430808 · Cited by 1,559
The relation between earnings and cash flows
Dechow, P. M., Kothari, S. P., & L. Watts, R. (1998) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(98)00020-2 · Cited by 1,551
Cited by
Earnings quality: Evidence from the field
Dichev, I. D., Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2013) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.05.004 · Cited by 1,103
The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review
Roychowdhury, S., Shroff, N., & Verdi, R. S. (2019) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.101246 · Cited by 749
Detecting Accounting Fraud in Publicly Traded U.S. Firms Using a Machine Learning Approach
BAO, Y., KE, B., LI, B., YU, Y. J., & ZHANG, J. (2020) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12292 · Cited by 499
The State of Corporate Governance Research
Bebchuk, L. A., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp121 · Cited by 435
SOX after Ten Years: A Multidisciplinary Review
Coates, J. C., & Srinivasan, S. (2014) · Accounting Horizons · doi:10.2308/acch-50759 · Cited by 228
Metadata
- Authors
- Kedia, S., & Philippon, T.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-03-17
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2169-2199
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2889572517
- Cited by
- 448
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 64.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/rfs/hhm016
- The paper
- Kedia, S., & Philippon, T. (2009). The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting. Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhm016
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.