The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation?☆
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Citations
Cites
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
(2008) · Corporate Financial Strategy · doi:10.4324/9780080942841-11 · Cited by 2,390
Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?*
Gabaix, X., & Landier, A. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.49 · Cited by 1,764
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530152466269 · Cited by 1,740 · cited 5×
“Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find there is less pay for luck when there is a large blockholder present.”
InfluentialStock prices and top management changes
Warner, J. B., Watts, R. L., & Wruck, K. H. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90054-2 · Cited by 1,568
Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
Hall, B., & Liebman, J. (1997) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w6213 · Cited by 1,291
CEO turnover and outside succession A cross-sectional analysis
Parrino, R. (1997) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00028-7 · Cited by 1,264
Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Terry, R. L. (1994) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)90038-8 · Cited by 1,156
The Other Side of the Trade‐Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation
Aggarwal, R. K., & Samwick, A. A. (1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250051 · Cited by 1,037
Cited by
Do Peer Firms Affect Corporate Financial Policy?
LEARY, M. T., & ROBERTS, M. R. (2014) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12094 · Cited by 1,148
Greenwash vs. Brownwash: Exaggeration and Undue Modesty in Corporate Sustainability Disclosure
Kim, E.-H., & Lyon, T. P. (2015) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2014.0949 · Cited by 932
Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936–2005
Frydman, C., & Saks, R. E. (2010) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp120 · Cited by 604
Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies
Kini, O., & Williams, R. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.09.005 · Cited by 499
Internalizing governance externalities: The role of institutional cross-ownership
He, J. (., Huang, J., & Zhao, S. (2019) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.07.019 · Cited by 413
Dividend payments as a response to peer influence
Grennan, J. (2019) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.01.012 · Cited by 320
Social learning and corporate peer effects
Kaustia, M., & Rantala, V. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.06.006 · Cited by 314
Are all CEOs above average? An empirical analysis of compensation peer groups and pay design
Bizjak, J., Lemmon, M., & Nguyen, T. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.007 · Cited by 298
Self-citationRelative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts
Gong, G., Li, L. Y., & Shin, J. Y. (2011) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.00000042 · Cited by 278
Corporate Governance Propagation through Overlapping Directors
Bouwman, C. H. S. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr034 · Cited by 265
Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation
Fahlenbrach, R. (2009) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfn011 · Cited by 258
Metadata
- Authors
- BIZJAK, J., LEMMON, M., & NAVEEN, L.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-11
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 152-168
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124400623
- Cited by
- 509
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 74.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.