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Cited by 258

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation

Open access
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger·2009·Review of Finance

Abstract

I analyze the role of executive compensation in corporate governance. As proxies for corporate governance, I use board size, board independence, CEO-chair duality, institutional ownership concentration, CEO tenure, and an index of shareholder rights. The results from a broad cross-section of large U.S. public firms are inconsistent with recent claims that entrenched managers design their own compensation contracts. The interactions of the corporate governance mechanisms with total pay-for-performance and excess compensation can be explained by governance substitution. If a firm has generally weaker governance, the compensation contract helps better align the interests of shareholders and the CEO.

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Crossref · 10.1093/rof/rfn011

Cites

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Metadata

Authors
Fahlenbrach, R.
Venue
Review of Finance
Published
2008-05-08
Volume
13
Issue
1
Pages
81-113
ISSN
  • 1382-6662 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-692X
  • 1572-3097
OpenAlex
W3122575033
Cited by
258
References
49
FWCI
54.85
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/rof/rfn011
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Fahlenbrach, R. (2009). Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation. Review of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfn011

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.