The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Institutional monitoring through shareholder litigation
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Cited by
Measuring securities litigation risk
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Metadata
- Authors
- Agnes Cheng, C. S., He Huang, H., Li, Y., & Lobo, G.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2010-03
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 356-383
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1982108055
- Cited by
- 298
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 31.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.