The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R
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Citations
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Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review
Christensen, H. B., Hail, L., & Leuz, C. (2021) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-021-09609-5 · Cited by 1,923
The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review
Roychowdhury, S., Shroff, N., & Verdi, R. S. (2019) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.101246 · Cited by 749
Non-executive employee stock options and corporate innovation
Chang, X., Fu, K., Low, A., & Zhang, W. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.09.002 · Cited by 625
Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies
Kini, O., & Williams, R. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.09.005 · Cited by 499
CEO Personal Risk-Taking and Corporate Policies
Cain, M. D., & McKeon, S. B. (2016) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109016000041 · Cited by 473
Metadata
- Authors
- Hayes, R. M., Lemmon, M., & Qiu, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2012-07
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 174-190
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2150718872
- Cited by
- 542
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 128.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.