The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The costs of shareholder activism: Evidence from a sequential decision model
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Cites
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“…shareholder’s incentives to actively monitor are determined by a trade-off between the private costs of monitoring, which are fully internalized by the activist, and the public benefits of monitoring, which are shared among all firm shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).”
Measuring Mutual Fund Performance with Characteristic‐Based Benchmarks
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Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance
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Cited by
Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors
McCAHERY, J. A., SAUTNER, Z., & STARKS, L. T. (2016) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12393 · Cited by 1,494
How does hedge fund activism reshape corporate innovation?
Brav, A., Jiang, W., Ma, S., & Tian, X. (2018) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.06.012 · Cited by 604
Blockholders and Corporate Governance
Edmans, A. (2014) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034455 · Cited by 476
Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary Review
Goranova, M., & Ryan, L. V. (2014) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206313515519 · Cited by 414
The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors
Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Hirst, S. (2017) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.31.3.89 · Cited by 402
The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Labor Outcomes
Brav, A., Jiang, W., & Kim, H. (2015) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhv037 · Cited by 391
Thirty years of shareholder activism: A survey of empirical research
Denes, M. R., Karpoff, J. M., & McWilliams, V. B. (2017) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.03.005 · Cited by 323
Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: The Incentive to Be Engaged
LEWELLEN, J., & LEWELLEN, K. (2022) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.13085 · Cited by 278
Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study
Becht, M., Franks, J., Grant, J., & Wagner, H. F. (2017) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhx048 · Cited by 264
Dynamic Models and Structural Estimation in Corporate Finance
Strebulaev, I. A. (2011) · Foundations and Trends® in Finance · doi:10.1561/0500000035 · Cited by 259
Metadata
- Authors
- Gantchev, N.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2013-03
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 610-631
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122856474
- Cited by
- 347
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 79.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.