The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate governance of banks and financial stability
Abstract
We find that shareholder-friendly corporate governance is associated with higher stand-alone and systemic risk in the banking sector. Specifically, shareholder-friendly corporate governance results in higher risk for larger banks and for banks that are located in countries with generous financial safety nets as banks try to shift risk toward taxpayers. We confirm our findings by comparing banks to nonfinancial firms and examining changes in bank risk around an exogenous regulatory change in governance. Our results underline the importance of the financial safety net and too-big-to-fail guarantees in thinking about corporate governance reforms at banks.
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Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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ON THE PRICING OF CORPORATE DEBT: THE RISK STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES*
Merton, R. C. (1974) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03058.x · Cited by 10,581
Bank governance, regulation and risk taking
Laeven, L. A., & Levine, R. E. (2008) · Cited by 3,269
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099 · Cited by 2,906
Adrian, T., & Brunnermeier, M. K. (2016) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20120555 · Cited by 2,373
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Corporate Governance and Risk‐Taking
JOHN, K., LITOV, L., & YEUNG, B. (2008) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01372.x · Cited by 1,806
The determinants of board structure☆
LINCK, J., NETTER, J., & YANG, T. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.03.004 · Cited by 1,802
Cited by
Bătae, O. M., Dragomir, V. D., & Feleagă, L. (2021) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.125791 · Cited by 432
Do ESG strategies enhance bank stability during financial turmoil? Evidence from Europe
Chiaramonte, L., Dreassi, A., Girardone, C., & Piserà, S. (2022) · The European Journal of Finance · doi:10.1080/1351847x.2021.1964556 · Cited by 389
Corporate governance and firm performance: The sequel
Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. (2019) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.04.006 · Cited by 352
Metadata
- Authors
- Anginer, D., Demirguc-Kunt, A., Huizinga, H., & Ma, K.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2018-11
- Volume
- 130
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 327-346
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2777199483
- Cited by
- 321
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 25.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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