The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Conditional corruption
Open accessAbstract
We argue that the decision to bribe bureaucrats depends on the frequency of corruption within a society. We provide a behavioral model to explain this conduct: engaging in corruption results in a disutility of guilt. This implies that people observe a lower probability to be involved in corruption if on average the guilt level of others within a country is higher. We also explore whether and to what extent group dynamics or socialization and past experiences affect corruption. In other words, we explore theoretically and empirically whether corruption is contagious and whether conditional cooperation matters. We use the notion of “conditional corruption” for these effects. The empirical section presents evidence using two data sets at the micro level and a large macro level international panel data set covering almost 20 years. The results indicate that the willingness to engage in corruption is influenced by the perceived activities of peers and other individuals. Moreover, the panel data set at the macro level indicates that the past level of corruption has a strong impact on the current corruption level. JEL classification: K420, D720, D640, O170, J240
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Cites
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193904 · Cited by 3,970
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9 · Cited by 2,780
Social Norms and Economic Theory
Elster, J. (1989) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.3.4.99 · Cited by 2,071
Do People Mean What They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.2.67 · Cited by 1,391
Psychological foundations of incentives
Fehr, E., & Falk, A. (2002) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00208-2 · Cited by 1,240 · cited 1×
“Most papers in the literature (Rabin, 1998 and Falk and Fehr, 2002) explain conditional cooperation in terms of reciprocity.”
BackgroundCultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
Henrich, J. (2004) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00094-5 · Cited by 1,096 · cited 1×
“Alternatively, the concept of conformity (Henrich, 2004) has been used to explain conditional cooperation.”
BackgroundTax morale and conditional cooperation
Frey, B. S., & Torgler, B. (2007) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2006.10.006 · Cited by 671
Self-citation
Cited by
Potrafke, N. (2015) · The World Economy · doi:10.1111/twec.12174 · Cited by 450
Metadata
- Authors
- Dong, B., Dulleck, U., & Torgler, B.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Psychology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2012-06
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 609-627
- ISSN
- 0167-4870 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4232028214
- Cited by
- 185
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 15.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Dong, B., Dulleck, U., & Torgler, B. (2012). Conditional corruption. Journal of Economic Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2011.12.001
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