The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries
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Cited by
Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries
Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2002) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00158-4 · Cited by 1,309
Distributive Politics Around the World
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Targeting the Poor: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
Alatas, V., Banerjee, A., Hanna, R., Olken, B. A., & Tobias, J. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.4.1206 · Cited by 536
Decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program
Galasso, E., & Ravallion, M. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.01.002 · Cited by 465
Duflo, E., Dupas, P., & Kremer, M. (2015) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.11.008 · Cited by 398
Metadata
- Authors
- Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-04
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 675-704
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2021260897
- Cited by
- 391
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 72.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.