The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Representative evidence on lying costs
Open accessAbstract
A central assumption in economics is that people misreport their private information if this is to their material benefit. Several recent models depart from this assumption and posit that some people do not lie or at least do not lie maximally. These models invoke many different underlying motives including intrinsic lying costs, altruism, efficiency concerns, or conditional cooperation. To provide an empirically-validated microfoundation for these models, it is crucial to understand the relevance of the different potential motives. We measure the extent of lying costs among a representative sample of the German population by calling them at home. In our setup, participants have a clear monetary incentive to misreport, misreporting cannot be detected, reputational concerns are negligible and altruism, efficiency concerns or conditional cooperation cannot play a role. Yet, we find that aggregate reporting behavior is close to the expected truthful distribution suggesting that lying costs are large and widespread. Further lab experiments show that this result is not driven by the mode of communication.
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Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
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Strategic information transmission
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The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance
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Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803321947001 · Cited by 1,874
Cited by
Abeler, J., Nosenzo, D., & Raymond, C. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2840132 · Cited by 840
Self-citationIntrinsic honesty and the prevalence of rule violations across societies
Gächter, S., & Schulz, J. F. (2016) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature17160 · Cited by 551
Lying Aversion and the Size of the Lie
Gneezy, U., Kajackaite, A., & Sobel, J. (2018) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20161553 · Cited by 481
The Dynamics of Motivated Beliefs
Zimmermann, F. (2020) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20180728 · Cited by 312
Let’s be honest: A review of experimental evidence of honesty and truth-telling
Rosenbaum, S. M., Billinger, S., & Stieglitz, N. (2014) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2014.10.002 · Cited by 288
Metadata
- Authors
- Abeler, J., Becker, A., & Falk, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2014-05
- Volume
- 113
- Pages
- 96-104
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2041981340
- Cited by
- 346
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 90.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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