The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The hidden costs of nudging: Experimental evidence from reminders in fundraising
Open accessAbstract
We document the hidden costs of a popular nudge and show how these costs distort policy making when neglected. In a field experiment with a charity, we find reminders increasing intended behavior (donations), but also increasing avoidance behavior (unsubscriptions from the mailing list). We develop a dynamic model of donation and unsubscription behavior with limited attention. We test the model in a second field experiment which also provides evidence that the hidden costs are anticipated. The model is estimated structurally to perform a welfare analysis . Not accounting for hidden costs overstates the welfare effects for donors by factor ten and hides potential negative welfare effects of the charity.
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Cites
Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving
Andreoni, J. (1990) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234133 · Cited by 5,825 · cited 3×
“…tractability and implies that the model solution has a sequential structure: the donor simply conditions on the optimal donation rule when making 10This is similar to the predictions of usual static models of giving in Andreoni (1989, 1990) and DellaVigna et al. (2012). his unsubscription decision.”
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803321947001 · Cited by 1,874
Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
Dana, J., Weber, R. A., & Kuang, J. X. (2007) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0153-z · Cited by 1,445 · cited 3×
“Annoyance costs can be psychological costs such as guilt or perceived pressure or practical costs such as time and attention (Dana et al., 2007; Andreoni et al., 2011; DellaVigna et al., 2012; Knutsson et al., 2013; Cain et al., 2014; Trachtman et al., 2015).”
Allcott, H., & Rogers, T. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.10.3003 · Cited by 1,340
Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving
DellaVigna, S., List, J. A., & Malmendier, U. (2012) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr050 · Cited by 1,080
Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts
Handel, B. R. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.7.2643 · Cited by 707
Bhargava, S., & Manoli, D. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20121493 · Cited by 640 · cited 2×
“, 2012), take-up of social benefits (Bhargava and Manoli, 2015), electricity consumption (Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Gilbert and Zivin, 2014), and giving to charitable organizations (Huck and Rasul, 2010; Sonntag and Zizzo, 2015).”
Cited by
Hummel, D., & Maedche, A. (2019) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2019.03.005 · Cited by 543
Realizing the potential of digital development: The case of agricultural advice
Fabregas, R., Kremer, M., & Schilbach, F. (2019) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aay3038 · Cited by 501
Damgaard, M. T., & Nielsen, H. S. (2018) · Economics of Education Review · doi:10.1016/j.econedurev.2018.03.008 · Cited by 321
Self-citationAndor, M. A., & Fels, K. M. (2018) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.01.018 · Cited by 306
Nudging with care: the risks and benefits of social information
Bicchieri, C., & Dimant, E. (2022) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-019-00684-6 · Cited by 277
Metadata
- Authors
- Damgaard, M. T., & Gravert, C.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2018-01
- Volume
- 157
- Pages
- 15-26
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3024038044
- Cited by
- 183
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 11.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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