How mutation affects evolutionary games on graphs
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Evolutionary dynamics are affected by population structure, mutation rates and update rules. Spatial or network structure facilitates the clustering of strategies, which represents a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Mutation dilutes this effect. Here we analyze how mutation influences evolutionary clustering on graphs. We introduce new mathematical methods to evolutionary game theory, specifically the analysis of coalescing random walks via generating functions. These techniques allow us to derive exact identity-by-descent (IBD) probabilities, which characterize spatial assortment on lattices and Cayley trees. From these IBD probabilities we obtain exact conditions for the evolution of cooperation and other game strategies, showing the dual effects of graph topology and mutation rate. High mutation rates diminish the clustering of cooperators, hindering their evolutionary success. Our model can represent either genetic evolution with mutation, or social imitation processes with random strategy exploration.
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Cites
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894 · cited 1×
“For these behaviors to evolve, some evolutionary mechanism must be present enabling cooperators to overcome the fitness disadvantages they incur (Nowak, 2006).”
Self-citationA simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04605 · Cited by 2,208 · cited 18×
“F can be any increasing differentiable function satisfying Fð0Þ 1⁄4 F 0ð0Þ 1⁄4 1, for example FðdpÞ 1⁄4 1þdp (Nowak et al., 2004; Ohtsuki et al., 2006) or FðdpÞ 1⁄4 edp (Traulsen et al.”
InfluentialSelf-citationCoevolution of Strategy and Structure in Complex Networks with Dynamical Linking
Pacheco, J. M., Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.97.258103 · Cited by 697
Self-citationReputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks
Fu, F., Hauert, C., Nowak, M. A., & Wang, L. (2008) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.78.026117 · Cited by 682 · cited 1×
“…to studying such questions is provided by evolutionary graph theory (Lieberman et al., 2005; Santos and Pacheco, 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2007; Szabó and Fá th, 2007; Pacheco et al., 2006; Fu et al., 2008; Roca et al., 2009b; Perc and Szolnoki, 2010; Fehl et al., in press).”
Self-citationStrategy selection in structured populations
Tarnita, C. E., Ohtsuki, H., Antal, T., Fu, F., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.03.035 · Cited by 281 · cited 3×
“Tarnita et al. (2009b) proved that for any population structure, mutation rate, and update rule satisfying certain fundamental assumptions (Tarnita et al., 2009b), there is an invariant sAR which is independent of the evolutionary game under consideration.”
Self-citationEvolutionary dynamics in set structured populations
Tarnita, C. E., Antal, T., Ohtsuki, H., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0903019106 · Cited by 264
Self-citationFehl, K., van der Post, D. J., & Semmann, D. (2011) · Ecology Letters · doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2011.01615.x · Cited by 220
Evolution of Cooperation on Stochastic Dynamical Networks
Wu, B., Zhou, D., Fu, F., Luo, Q., Wang, L., & Traulsen, A. (2010) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011187 · Cited by 193
Self-citation
Cited by
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,308
Self-citationEvolutionary dynamics on any population structure
Allen, B., Lippner, G., Chen, Y.-T., Fotouhi, B., Momeni, N., Yau, S.-T., & Nowak, M. A. (2017) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature21723 · Cited by 534
Self-citationStatic network structure can stabilize human cooperation
Rand, D. G., Nowak, M. A., Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1400406111 · Cited by 290
Self-citationA mathematical formalism for natural selection with arbitrary spatial and genetic structure
Allen, B., & McAvoy, A. (2019) · Journal of Mathematical Biology · doi:10.1007/s00285-018-1305-z · Cited by 37
Self-citationEvaluating the structure-coefficient theorem of evolutionary game theory
McAvoy, A., & Wakeley, J. (2022) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2119656119 · Cited by 23
“Mutation has long been recognized as an integral part of evolutionary game theory, in both deterministic [58, 59] and stochastic [60–62] models.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Allen, B., Traulsen, A., Tarnita, C. E., & Nowak, M. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2012-04
- Volume
- 299
- Pages
- 97-105
- ISSN
- 0022-5193 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2161629996
- Cited by
- 90
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 26.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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