Neural signals encoding shifts in beliefs
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Dopamine is implicated in a diverse range of cognitive functions including cognitive flexibility, task switching, signalling novel or unexpected stimuli as well as advance information. There is also longstanding line of thought that links dopamine with belief formation and, crucially, aberrant belief formation in psychosis. Integrating these strands of evidence would suggest that dopamine plays a central role in belief updating and more specifically in encoding of meaningful information content in observations. The precise nature of this relationship has remained unclear. To directly address this question we developed a paradigm that allowed us to decompose two distinct types of information content, information-theoretic surprise that reflects the unexpectedness of an observation, and epistemic value that induces shifts in beliefs or, more formally, Bayesian surprise. Using functional magnetic-resonance imaging in humans we show that dopamine-rich midbrain regions encode shifts in beliefs whereas surprise is encoded in prefrontal regions, including the pre-supplementary motor area and dorsal cingulate cortex. By linking putative dopaminergic activity to belief updating these data provide a link to false belief formation that characterises hyperdopaminergic states associated with idiopathic and drug induced psychosis.
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Cites
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120
Rao, R. P. N., & Ballard, D. H. (1999) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/4580 · Cited by 5,483 · cited 1×
“This is in keepingwith the general idea of the brain as a predictive organ (Dayan et al., 1995; Rao and Ballard, 1999), and supports a distinction between the neuronal processing of meaningful information and simple surprise.”
BackgroundKapur, S. (2003) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.160.1.13 · Cited by 2,813 · cited 4×
“It has long been proposed that dopamine plays an important role in belief formation and, crucially, in aberrant belief formation in psychosis (Corlett et al., 2009; Howes et al., 2009; Howes et al., 2011a, 2011b; Kapur, 2003; Roiser et al., 2013; Shaner, 1999).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialThe Dopamine Hypothesis of Schizophrenia: Version III--The Final Common Pathway
Howes, O. D., & Kapur, S. (2009) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbp006 · Cited by 2,693 · cited 2×
“In particular, it is widely hypothesised that dysregulated dopaminergic function leads to increased salience being conferred on sensory stimuli, a step in a path leading to psychosis (Howes and Kapur, 2009) (though the precise mechanisms by which this might occur remain to be mapped out).”
BackgroundDopamine in motivational control: rewarding, aversive, and alerting
Bromberg-Martin, E. S., Matsumoto, M., & Hikosaka, O. (2010) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.11.022 · Cited by 2,396 · cited 2×
“It also resonates with observations showing dopamine neurons respond to both novel and unexpected stimuli (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Bunzeck and Düzel, 2006; Horvitz, 2000; Iglesias et al., 2013) and reflect preferences for advance information (Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka, 2009).”
BackgroundThe debate over dopamine’s role in reward: the case for incentive salience
Berridge, K. C. (2007) · Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1007/s00213-006-0578-x · Cited by 2,347
Dissociable Roles of Ventral and Dorsal Striatum in Instrumental Conditioning
O'Doherty, J., Dayan, P., Schultz, J., Deichmann, R., Friston, K., & Dolan, R. J. (2004) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1094285 · Cited by 2,088 · cited 1×
“Finally, we tested for monetary outcome and reward prediction error effects at outcome time, which are typically associated with activity in the dopaminergic midbrain and its targets such as the ventral striatum(O'Doherty et al., 2004; Schultz, 2012; Schultz et al., 1997).”
MethodSelf-citationDiscrete coding of reward probability and uncertainty by dopamine neurons
Fiorillo, C. D., Tobler, P. N., & Schultz, W. (2003) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1077349 · Cited by 2,085
The multiple-demand (MD) system of the primate brain: mental programs for intelligent behaviour
Duncan, J. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.01.004 · Cited by 1,846 · cited 1×
“Thus, in keeping with prior work, we show that informationtheoretic surprise was encoded in regions typically associated with internal conflict and task difficulty, such as the pre-SMA and dorsal cingulate cortex (Duncan, 2010; Kool and Botvinick, 2013).”
ResultBayesian surprise attracts human attention
Itti, L., & Baldi, P. (2009) · Vision Research · doi:10.1016/j.visres.2008.09.007 · Cited by 1,224
Cited by
Computational mechanisms of curiosity and goal-directed exploration
Schwartenbeck, P., Passecker, J., Hauser, T. U., FitzGerald, T. H., Kronbichler, M., & Friston, K. J. (2019) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.41703 · Cited by 254
Self-citationFouragnan, E., Retzler, C., & Philiastides, M. G. (2018) · Human Brain Mapping · doi:10.1002/hbm.24047 · Cited by 176
Dopamine neurons respond to errors in the prediction of sensory features of expected rewards
Takahashi, Y. K., Batchelor, H. M., Liu, B., Khanna, A., Morales, M., & Schoenbaum, G. (2017) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2017.08.025 · Cited by 200
“A dependence on internal beliefs has also been observed for more conventional value-based error signals (Lak et al., 2017; Schwartenbeck et al., 2016).”
BackgroundPredictive processing, source monitoring, and psychosis
Griffin, J. D., & Fletcher, P. C. (2017) · Annual Review of Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-032816-045145 · Cited by 133
Interoception as modeling, allostasis as control
Sennesh, E., Theriault, J., Brooks, D., van de Meent, J.-W., Barrett, L. F., & Quigley, K. S. (2022) · Biological Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2021.108242 · Cited by 107
Metadata
- Authors
- Schwartenbeck, P., FitzGerald, T. H. B., & Dolan, R.
- Venue
- NeuroImage
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2016-01
- Volume
- 125
- Pages
- 578-586
- ISSN
- 1053-8119 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2211680833
- Cited by
- 82
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 3.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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