The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The illusion of knowledge: When more information reduces accuracy and increases confidence
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Citations
Cites
Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.4.650 · Cited by 3,504 · cited 3×
“Todorov (2002) also showed that a version of the Take-the-Best algorithm ( Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996, 1999 ) predicts 60.4% of the inconsistent games.”
BackgroundInfluentialWhen choice is demotivating: can one desire too much of a good thing?
Iyengar, S. S., & Lepper, M. R. (2000) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.79.6.995 · Cited by 2,878 · cited 2×
“…versus less-is-more in predictions of uncertain outcomes The studies on clinical and actuarial predictions, as well as studies on choice among multiple options (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 2004), have emphasized the negative effects of having knowledge on decisions—the more-is-less effect.”
“Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment.”
Dawes, R. M., Faust, D., & Meehl, P. E. (1989) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.2648573 · Cited by 2,298 · cited 2×
“These studies have shown that simple statistical models do better in predicting patients’ outcome than expert judgments of clinicians ( Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989 ).”
Timid choices and bold forecasts: a cognitive perspective on risk taking.
Kahneman, D., & Lovallo, D. (1993) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.39.1.17 · Cited by 2,043 · cited 1×
“This anecdotal failure of prediction illustrates a general case in which people can treat the predicted event as unique and not amenable to statistical generalizations (Einhorn, 1986; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993).”
BackgroundPreference and belief: Ambiguity and competence in choice under uncertainty
Heath, C., & Tversky, A. (1991) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00057884 · Cited by 1,654
Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Kleinbölting, H. (1991) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.98.4.506 · Cited by 1,506
Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic.
Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.109.1.75 · Cited by 1,352 · cited 3×
“A perfect example of this tradition of research is the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, 2002).”
BackgroundResultHuman Judgment and Social Policy: Irreducible Uncertainty, Inevitable Error, Unavoidable Injustice
Hammond, K. R. (1996) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195097344.001.0001 · Cited by 851
The dilution effect: Nondiagnostic information weakens the implications of diagnostic information
Nisbett, R. E., Zukier, H., & Lemley, R. E. (1981) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(81)90010-4 · Cited by 605 · cited 3×
“First, we argue that knowledge of team names reduces the weight of sta- 1 This effect is similar to the dilution effect (Nisbett et al., 1981; Zukier, 1982), where non-diagnostic or pseudo-diagnostic information (e.g., Hilton & Fein, 1989) reduces the influence of actuarial information.”
Background
Cited by
Making sense of recommendations
Yeomans, M., Shah, A., Mullainathan, S., & Kleinberg, J. (2019) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.2118 · Cited by 459
The influence of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on individuals' knowledge sharing behavior
Hung, S.-Y., Durcikova, A., Lai, H.-M., & Lin, W.-M. (2011) · International Journal of Human-Computer Studies · doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2011.02.004 · Cited by 406
Riedl, R., Hubert, M., & Kenning, P. (2010) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/20721434 · Cited by 354
The self-consistency model of subjective confidence.
Koriat, A. (2012) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0025648 · Cited by 320
Kliegr, T., Bahník, Š., & Fürnkranz, J. (2021) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2021.103458 · Cited by 139
Social distraction? Social media use and political knowledge in two U.S. Presidential elections
Lee, S., & Xenos, M. (2019) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2018.08.006 · Cited by 124
Confidence Calibration in a Multiyear Geopolitical Forecasting Competition
Moore, D. A., Swift, S. A., Minster, A., Mellers, B., Ungar, L., Tetlock, P., Yang, H. H. J., & Tenney, E. R. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2525 · Cited by 74
“On the one hand, there are circumstances in which new information increases confidence more than accuracy, exacerbating overconfidence (Hall et al. 2007, Heath and Gonzalez 1995, Oskamp 1965).”
BackgroundHow digital startups use competitive intelligence to pivot
Sadeghiani, A., Shokouhyar, S., & Ahmadi, S. (2022) · Digital Business · doi:10.1016/j.digbus.2022.100034 · Cited by 20
Metadata
- Authors
- Hall, C. C., Ariss, L., & Todorov, A.
- Venue
- Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-07
- Volume
- 103
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 277-290
- ISSN
- 0749-5978 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1984693961
- Cited by
- 194
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 3.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.