The DOI matches its Crossref record; 177 of the 177 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The self-consistency model of subjective confidence.
Abstract
How do people monitor the correctness of their answers? A self-consistency model is proposed for the process underlying confidence judgments and their accuracy. In answering a 2-alternative question, participants are assumed to retrieve a sample of representations of the question and base their confidence on the consistency with which the chosen answer is supported across representations. Confidence is modeled by analogy to the calculation of statistical level of confidence (SLC) in testing hypotheses about a population and represents the participant's assessment of the likelihood that a new sample will yield the same choice. Assuming that participants draw representations from a commonly shared item-specific population of representations, predictions were derived regarding the function relating confidence to inter-participant consensus and intra-participant consistency for the more preferred (majority) and the less preferred (minority) choices. The predicted pattern was confirmed for several different tasks. The confidence-accuracy relationship was shown to be a by-product of the consistency-correctness relationship: It is positive because the answers that are consistently chosen are generally correct, but negative when the wrong answers tend to be favored. The overconfidence bias stems from the reliability-validity discrepancy: Confidence monitors reliability (or self-consistency), but its accuracy is evaluated in calibration studies against correctness. Simulation and empirical results suggest that response speed is a frugal cue for self-consistency, and its validity depends on the validity of self-consistency in predicting performance. Another mnemonic cue-accessibility, which is the overall amount of information that comes to mind-makes an added, independent contribution. Self-consistency and accessibility may correspond to the 2 parameters that affect SLC: sample variance and sample size.
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“Instead, a more general computational definition posits that propositional confidence reflects the probability of making a self-consistent choice across multiple presentations of the same decision problem (Boundy-Singer et al. 2023, Caziot & Mamassian 2021, Koriat 2012).”
From Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis (2024) · cites this paper as Koriat 2012
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Cites
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Cited by
Metcalfe, J. (2017) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010416-044022 · Cited by 483
Confidence as Bayesian probability: From neural origins to behavior
Meyniel, F., Sigman, M., & Mainen, Z. F. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.09.039 · Cited by 349
Supra-personal cognitive control and metacognition
Shea, N., Boldt, A., Bang, D., Yeung, N., Heyes, C., & Frith, C. D. (2014) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2014.01.006 · Cited by 368
Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology
Nagel, J. (2012) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00634.x · Cited by 337
When are two heads better than one and why?
Koriat, A. (2012) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1216549 · Cited by 256
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Koriat, A.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2012-01
- Volume
- 119
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 80-113
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2001557538
- Cited by
- 320
- References
- 177
- FWCI
- 6.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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