The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Toward a computational framework for cognitive biology: Unifying approaches from cognitive neuroscience and comparative cognition
Open accessAbstract
Progress in understanding cognition requires a quantitative, theoretical framework, grounded in the other natural sciences and able to bridge between implementational, algorithmic and computational levels of explanation. I review recent results in neuroscience and cognitive biology that, when combined, provide key components of such an improved conceptual framework for contemporary cognitive science. Starting at the neuronal level, I first discuss the contemporary realization that single neurons are powerful tree-shaped computers, which implies a reorientation of computational models of learning and plasticity to a lower, cellular, level. I then turn to predictive systems theory (predictive coding and prediction-based learning) which provides a powerful formal framework for understanding brain function at a more global level. Although most formal models concerning predictive coding are framed in associationist terms, I argue that modern data necessitate a reinterpretation of such models in cognitive terms: as model-based predictive systems. Finally, I review the role of the theory of computation and formal language theory in the recent explosion of comparative biological research attempting to isolate and explore how different species differ in their cognitive capacities. Experiments to date strongly suggest that there is an important difference between humans and most other species, best characterized cognitively as a propensity by our species to infer tree structures from sequential data. Computationally, this capacity entails generative capacities above the regular (finite-state) level; implementationally, it requires some neural equivalent of a push-down stack. I dub this unusual human propensity "dendrophilia", and make a number of concrete suggestions about how such a system may be implemented in the human brain, about how and why it evolved, and what this implies for models of language acquisition. I conclude that, although much remains to be done, a neurally-grounded framework for theoretical cognitive science is within reach that can move beyond polarized debates and provide a more adequate theoretical future for cognitive biology.
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“Based both on such computational considerations, and neuroscientific evidence, it has long been suspected that the nervous system might rely on predictive coding, and encode residual errors relative to models [155,176,196,209].”
BackgroundThe faculty of language: what is it, who has it, and how did it evolve?
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Cited by
Dehaene, S., Meyniel, F., Wacongne, C., Wang, L., & Pallier, C. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.09.019 · Cited by 478
The cognitive cell: bacterial behavior reconsidered
Lyon, P. (2015) · Frontiers in Microbiology · doi:10.3389/fmicb.2015.00264 · Cited by 392
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
Neurophysiological dynamics of phrase-structure building during sentence processing
Nelson, M. J., El Karoui, I., Giber, K., Yang, X., Cohen, L., Koopman, H., Cash, S. S., Naccache, L., Hale, J. T., Pallier, C., et al. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1701590114 · Cited by 319
Empirical approaches to the study of language evolution
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fitch, W. T.
- Venue
- Physics of Life Reviews
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2014-09
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 329-364
- ISSN
- 1571-0645 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2111900560
- Cited by
- 223
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 10.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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