Cited by 142Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Reciprocity and the emergence of reputation

Pollock, Gregory, Dugatkin, Lee Alan·1992·Journal of Theoretical Biology

Integrity signals

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Crossref · 10.1016/s0022-5193(05)80765-9

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The widespread tendency to judge actions between third parties, and the readiness for cooperation combined with altruistic punishment (strong reciprocity) has been neatly captured in an experiment involving three players.

    “The widespread tendency to judge actions between third parties, and the readiness for cooperation combined with altruistic punishment (also known as strong reciprocity 69 ) has been neatly captured in an experiment involving three players 70,71 .”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [69]

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Authors
Pollock, G., & Dugatkin, L. A.
Affiliations
Northwestern University (US)
Corresponding author
Pollock, Gregory
Venue
Journal of Theoretical Biology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1992-11
Volume
159
Issue
1
Pages
25-37
ISSN
0022-5193 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2048943795
Cited by
142
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 2 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 1
FWCI
65.37
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Journal of Theoretical Biology (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
reputation, reciprocity, tit-for-tat, evolutionary stability, invasion resistance, clustering

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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