A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 73 of the 74 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Direct and indirect reciprocity are key mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Direct reciprocity means that individuals use their own experience to decide whether to cooperate with another person. Indirect reciprocity means that they also consider the experiences of others. Although these two mechanisms are intertwined, they are typically studied in isolation. Here, we introduce a mathematical framework that allows us to explore both kinds of reciprocity simultaneously. We show that the well-known 'generous tit-for-tat' strategy of direct reciprocity has a natural analogue in indirect reciprocity, which we call 'generous scoring'. Using an equilibrium analysis, we characterize under which conditions either of the two strategies can maintain cooperation. With simulations, we additionally explore which kind of reciprocity evolves when members of a population engage in social learning to adapt to their environment. Our results draw unexpected connections between direct and indirect reciprocity while highlighting important differences regarding their evolvability.
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“However, image scoring is unstable as individuals have no incentive to defect against defectors to defend themselves from exploitation, because any form of defection would harm their own reputation [43].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [43]
Citations
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“They study either direct reciprocity using repeated games 5–18 or indirect reciprocity using donor-recipient games 20–23 .”
Self-citationEvolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice
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“Its value can be computed explicitly, by representing equation (6) in matrix notation (Supplementary Sect.”
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Cited by
Hao, X., Liu, G., Zhang, X., & Dong, L. (2022) · Technological Forecasting and Social Change · doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2022.121627 · Cited by 77
Direct and indirect reciprocity among individuals and groups
Romano, A., Saral, A. S., & Wu, J. (2021) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.08.003 · Cited by 78
Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints
Park, P. S., Nowak, M. A., & Hilbe, C. (2022) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-022-28336-2 · Cited by 50
“Traditionally, researchers capture the logic of direct reciprocity with the repeated prisoner ’ s dilemma 4 – 17 .”
Self-citationEvolution of norms for judging social behavior
Kessinger, T. A., Tarnita, C. E., & Plotkin, J. B. (2023) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2219480120 · Cited by 54
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Metadata
- Authors
- Schmid, L., Chatterjee, K., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Institute of Science and Technology Austria (AT)
- Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology (DE)
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Schmid, Laura
- Venue
- Nature Human Behaviour
- Published
- 2021-05-13
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 1292-1302
- ISSN
- 2397-3374 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3160058660
- Cited by
- 161
- References
- 74
- Citations by year
- 2026: 40 · 2025: 33 · 2024: 34 · 2023: 30 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 5
- FWCI
- 30.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (tdm)
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (vor)
- Locations
- Nature Human Behaviour (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, evolution of cooperation, reputation, social learning, equilibrium analysis, cooperative strategy, unified framework
- MeSH terms
- Social Learning, Social Interaction, Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Models, Psychological, Operations Research, Social Adjustment, Social Environment
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- Schmid, L., Chatterjee, K., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2021). A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8
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