An economic model of moral motivation
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PCT involves a dual-layered feedback structure: immediate economic feedback through market transactions versus delayed collective environmental outcomes, creating psychological tension between tangible financial signals and abstract climate goals.
“Third, PCT involves a dual-layered feedback structure: immediate economic feedback through market transactions versus delayed collective environmental outcomes. This creates psychological tension between tangible financial signals and abstract climate goals—a complexity absent in purely altruistic behaviors like recycling or donating [12].”
From The power of loss: message framing, climate anxiety, and engagement in personal carbon trading (2025) · cites this paper as [12]
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Cites
Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving
Andreoni, J. (1990) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234133 · Cited by 5,825 · see citing works
Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All*
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554917 · Cited by 2,175 · see citing works
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Research works printed but not linked: 13
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- Bernheim, B. D. (1986): On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods, *American Economic Review* 76 (4), 789-793.
- Brennan, G., and L. Lomasky (1993): *Democracy and Decision. The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Deci, E. L., and R. M. Ryan (1985): *Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behavior*, New York: Plenum Press.
- Frey, B. S., and F. Oberholzer-Gee (1997): The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, *American Economic Review* 87 (4), 746-755.
- Harsanyi, J. C. (1955): Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, *Journal of Political Economy* 63, 309-321.
- Holländer, H. (1990): A Social Exchange Approach to Voluntary Cooperation, *American Economic Review*, 80, 1157-1167.
- Lindbeck, A. (1997): Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behavior, *American Economic Review* 87 (2), 370-377.
- March, J. G., and and J. P. Olsen (1995): *Democratic Governance*, New York: Free Press.
- Margolis, H. (1982): *Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mead, G.H. (1913): The social self, *Journal of Philosophy*, 10, 374-380.
- Nyborg, K. (2000): Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus: Interpretation and Aggregation of Environmental Values, *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 42, 305-322.
- Sugden, R. (1984): Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods Through Voluntary Contributions, *The Economic Journal* 94, 772-787.
Cited by
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Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1652 · Cited by 3,357 · see citing works
Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review
Treviño, L. K., Weaver, G. R., & Reynolds, S. J. (2006) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206306294258 · Cited by 1,837 · see citing works
Saphores, J.-D. M., Ogunseitan, O. A., & Shapiro, A. A. (2012) · Resources, Conservation and Recycling · doi:10.1016/j.resconrec.2011.12.003 · Cited by 392 · see citing works
Waste prevention and social preferences: the role of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations
Cecere, G., Mancinelli, S., & Mazzanti, M. (2014) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.07.007 · Cited by 242 · see citing works
Miliute-Plepiene, J., Hage, O., Plepys, A., & Reipas, A. (2016) · Resources, Conservation and Recycling · doi:10.1016/j.resconrec.2016.05.008 · Cited by 160 · see citing works
Cooperation in the Climate Commons
Carattini, S., Levin, S., & Tavoni, A. (2019) · Review of Environmental Economics and Policy · doi:10.1093/reep/rez009 · Cited by 134 · see citing works
Increasing altruistic and cooperative behaviour with simple moral nudges
Capraro, V., Jagfeld, G., Klein, R., Mul, M., & de Pol, I. V. (2019) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-019-48094-4 · Cited by 135 · see citing works
The power of loss: message framing, climate anxiety, and engagement in personal carbon trading
Li, T., Yang, Y., Liu, X., & Zeng, S. (2025) · BMC Psychology · doi:10.1186/s40359-025-03713-w · Cited by 1 · see citing works
- Authors
- Brekke, K. A., Kverndokk, S., & Nyborg, K.
- Affiliations
- University of Oslo (NO)
- Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research (NO)
- Corresponding author
- Nyborg, Karine
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2003-09
- Volume
- 87
- Issue
- 9-10
- Pages
- 1967-1983
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125329982
- Cited by
- 615
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 17 · 2025: 26 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 25 · 2022: 37 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 35 · 2018: 33 · 2017: 34 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 45 · 2014: 30 · 2013: 27 · 2012: 33
- FWCI
- 52.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Journal of Public Economics (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Policies and Impacts
- Keywords
- moral motivation, voluntary contributions, public goods, self-image, social responsibility, relative prices, budget constraints, time constraints, economic incentives, recycling behavior, public policy
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