Cited by 126Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEmbodied and Extended CognitionFree Will and Agency

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 93 of the 105 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 15 of the 77 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary with examples

Open access
Metzinger, Thomas·2007·Progress in Brain Research

Abstract

A concise sketch of the self-model theory of subjectivity (SMT; Metzinger, 2003a), aimed at empirical researchers. Discussion of some candidate mechanisms by which self-awareness could appear in a physically realized information-processing system like the brain, using empirical examples from various scientific disciplines. The paper introduces two core-concepts, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation" (PMIR), developing a representationalist analysis of the conscious self and the emergence of a first-person perspective.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/s0079-6123(07)68018-2

Cites

93 of 93 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

163 Own interpretation · 25 No full text of the sources · 15 Sources not found · 12 No basis given · 9 Supported · 6 Partly supported · 6 Own result · 5 Not checked yet · accuracy not yet measured

Show all 95 claims

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 67
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 105
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 3
146 of 146
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The properties in question for the emergence of a conscious self are representational and functional brain properties.

    “The self-model theory assumes that the properties in question are representational and functional brain properties.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The human self-model will be predominantly a neurocomputational theory.

    “Personally, I assume that this will be a predominately neurocomputational theory (see for instance, Churchland, 1989).”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The development and activation of the self-model computational module plays a role for the system, and the functional self-model possesses a true evolutionary description.

    “The obvious fact that the development of our self-model has a long biological, evolutionary, and (a somewhat shorter) social history can now be accounted for by introducing a teleofunctionalist background assumption, as it is often called in philosophy of mind”
    “The development and activation of this computational module plays a role for the system: the functional self-model possesses a true evolutionary description, i.e., it was a weapon that was invented and continuously optimized in the course of a ''cognitive arms race'' (Clark, 1989, p. 61).”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    First-person reports about the experiential content of the OBE state-class are accurate and sincere.

    “accurate and sincere first-person reports about the experiential content of this specific neurophenomenological state-class.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The Starfish robot's internal model qualifies as a self-model in the sense of the self-model theory.

    “Starfish not only synthesizes an internal selfmodel, but also uses this self-model to generate intelligent behavior.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    There is a certain part of the human self-model that is characterized by a high degree of stimulus correlation and that depends exclusively on internally generated information.

    “Philosophically, it is not as much the neurobiological details that are crucial as the highly plausible assumption that there is a certain part of the human self-model that is characterized by a high degree of stimulus correlation and that depends exclusively on internally generated information.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Some elementary building block of human tool-use abilities already existed in the brains of our ancestors.

    “One may plausibly assume that some elementary building block of human tool-use abilities already existed in the brains of our ancestors.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Monkeys have the conscious experience of ownership rather than only the unconscious mechanism.

    “Of course, we do not know if monkeys actually have the conscious experience of ownership or only the unconscious mechanism.But we do know about several similarities between macaques and humans that make this assumption seem plausible.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    There is a physical flow of time.

    “within the physical flow of time”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    There is a subpersonal level of self-organization in the brain.

    “In this ongoing process on the subpersonal level there is no agent”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The brain is a self-organizing physical system.

    “selforganizing physical universe”
11 of 11

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Show all 105 references

Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. Alvarado, 1986, Research on spontaneous out-of-body experiences: a review of modern developments, 1960–1984
  2. Blackmore, 1986, Spontaneous and deliberate OBEs: a questionnaire survey, J. Soc. Psych. Res., 53, 218
  3. Brugger, 2001, Hand movement observation in a person born without hands: is body scheme innate?, J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry, 70, 276
  4. Irwin, H. (1985) Flight of mind. Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, NJ and London.
  5. Metzinger, T. (Ed.) (1995b). Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic, Thorverton, UK.
  6. Metzinger, T. (2005a). Précis of “Being No One”. In: PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Consciousness, 11(5): 1–35. URL: www.psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/
  7. Ruhnau, E. (1995). Time-Gestalt and the observer. In: Metzinger T., (Ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic, Thorverton.
  8. Vuilleumier, 1997, Héautoscopie, exta-se et hallucinations expérientielles d’origine épileptique, Rev. Neurol., 153, 115

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Metzinger, T.
Affiliations
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (DE)
Corresponding author
Metzinger, Thomas
Venue
Progress in Brain Research
Publisher
Elsevier
Published
2007
Volume
168
Pages
215-278
ISSN
0079-6123 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1482860377
Cited by
123
References
105
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 9
FWCI
16.36
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Progress in brain research (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
self-awareness, first-person perspective, consciousness, representationalism, intentionality
MeSH terms
Consciousness, Ego, Humans, Self Concept, Self Psychology, Intention, Empirical Research

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