The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Thinking the unthinkable: sacred values and taboo cognitions
Abstract
Many people insist that their commitments to certain values (e.g. love, honor, justice) are absolute and inviolable - in effect, sacred. They treat the mere thought of trading off sacred values against secular ones (such as money) as transparently outrageous - in effect, taboo. Economists insist, however, that in a world of scarce resources, taboo trade-offs are unavoidable. Research shows that, although people do respond with moral outrage to taboo trade-offs, they often acquiesce when secular violations of sacred values are rhetorically reframed as routine or tragic trade-offs. The results reveal the peculiar character of moral boundaries on what is thinkable, alternately punitively rigid and forgivingly flexible.
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“However, since moral values appear to be deeply-held, stable across time, and resistant to change 11 – 13 , a parallel literature on moral cognition makes a different prediction: insofar as punishment is a method of restoring justice following a moral violation, punitive preferences should be less susceptible to group influence.”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [11]
Citations
Cites
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Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048 · cited 2×
“6, 517–523 34 Haidt, J. (2001) The emotional dog and its rational tail: a socialintuitionist approach to moral judgment.”
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Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (2013) · World Scientific Handbook in Financial Economics Series · doi:10.1142/9789814417358_0016 · Cited by 5,320
The Psychology of Self-Affirmation: Sustaining the Integrity of the Self
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Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Eire, C., (2003) Jesus lives. In Unmaking the West: Exploring Counterfactual Histories of Possible Worlds (Tetlock, P.E. et al., eds), University of California Press (in press).
- Tetlock, P.E. and McGraw, P. (2003) People as intuitive theologians: defending sacred values against secular encroachments. In Relational Theory (Haslam, N., ed.), Cambridge University Press (in press).
Cited by
Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations.
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0015141 · Cited by 4,560
“Study 3: Moral Trade-Offs In Study 3, we adapted Tetlock’s work on sacred values and taboo trade-offs (Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) to make moral judgments more personal and visceral than they had been in Studies 1 and 2.”
The Psychology of Learning and Motivation
Ross, B. H. (2012) · Cited by 2,633
Rethinking ecosystem services to better address and navigate cultural values
Chan, K. M. A., Satterfield, T., & Goldstein, J. (2012) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.11.011 · Cited by 1,563
“The first point is that some kinds of values are regarded as incommensurate because people reject outright the very possibility of tradeoffs—at least initially (‘protected’ or sacred values—Baron and Spranca, 1997; Tetlock, 2003).”
BackgroundThe Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief
Van Bavel, J. J., & Pereira, A. (2018) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.01.004 · Cited by 743
“Social groups fulfill numerous basic social needs such as belonging [29], distinctiveness [30], epistemic closure [31], and access to power and resources [32], as well as provide a framework for the endorsement of (moral) values [33,34].”
BackgroundMalle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2014.877340 · Cited by 632
Metadata
- Authors
- Tetlock, P. E.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Corresponding author
- Tetlock, Philip E.
- ORCID
- Tetlock, Philip E.
- Venue
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2003-07
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 320-324
- ISSN
- 1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2121366015
- Cited by
- 915
- References
- 36
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 51 · 2024: 76 · 2023: 78 · 2022: 61 · 2021: 73 · 2020: 98 · 2019: 79 · 2018: 46 · 2017: 30 · 2016: 37 · 2015: 41 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 34 · 2012: 30
- FWCI
- 0.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- Locations
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- sacred values, ethical trade-offs, moral boundaries, moral outrage, reframing, moral flexibility
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.