Debunking Arguments in Ethics
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 308 of the 308 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this crisply written book, Hanno Sauer offers the first book-length treatment of debunking arguments in ethics, developing an empirically informed and philosophically sophisticated account of genealogical arguments and their significance for the reliability of moral cognition. He breaks new ground by introducing a series of novel distinctions into the current debate, which allows him to develop a framework for assessing the prospects of debunking or vindicating our moral intuitions. He also challenges the justification of some of our moral judgments by showing that they are based on epistemically defective processes. His book is an original, cutting-edge contribution to the burgeoning field of empirically informed metaethics, and will interest philosophers, psychologists, and anyone interested in how - and whether - moral judgment works.
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Cited by
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“Finally, moral anthropology promises to enrich the recent debate about debunking arguments in moral philosophy (cf. Sauer 2018; e.g. Greene 2008; Klenk 2018a; Haidt 2001).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Sauer, H.
- Affiliations
- Utrecht University (NL)
- Corresponding author
- Sauer, Hanno
- ORCID
- Sauer, Hanno
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2018-07-19
- OpenAlex
- W2787416218
- Cited by
- 72
- References
- 308
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 14.24
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Universitätsbibliographie, Universität Duisburg-Essen (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- debunking arguments, moral intuitions, moral cognition, moral judgment, epistemic justification, moral psychology
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