Are ‘counter-intuitive’ deontological judgments really counter-intuitive? An empirical reply to Kahane et al.(2012)
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A substantial body of evidence indicates that utilitarian judgments (favoring the greater good) made in response to difficult moral dilemmas are preferentially supported by controlled, reflective processes, whereas deontological judgments (favoring rights/duties) in such cases are preferentially supported by automatic, intuitive processes. A recent neuroimaging study by Kahane et al. challenges this claim, using a new set of moral dilemmas that allegedly reverse the previously observed association. We report on a study in which we both induced and measured reflective responding to one of Greene et al.'s original dilemmas and one of Kahane et al.'s new dilemmas. For the original dilemma, induced reflection led to more utilitarian responding, replicating previous findings using the same methods. There was no overall effect of induced reflection for the new dilemma. However, for both dilemmas, the degree to which an individual engaged in prior reflection predicted the subsequent degree of utilitarian responding, with more reflective subjects providing more utilitarian judgments. These results cast doubt on Kahane et al.'s conclusions and buttress the original claim linking controlled, reflective processes to utilitarian judgment and automatic, intuitive processes to deontological judgment. Importantly, these results also speak to the generality of the underlying theory, indicating that what holds for cases involving utilitarian physical harms also holds for cases involving utilitarian lies.
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Citations
Cites
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making
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“Researchers have examined the cognitive and neural bases of moral judgment using neuroimaging (Greene et al., 2001, 2004), lesion methods (Mendez et al., 2005; Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007), psychopharmacology (Crockett et al., 2010) and more traditional behavioral methods…”
Self-citationDamage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements
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“…and neural bases of moral judgment using neuroimaging (Greene et al., 2001, 2004), lesion methods (Mendez et al., 2005; Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007), psychopharmacology (Crockett et al., 2010) and more traditional behavioral methods (Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006; Greene et…”
Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004 · Cited by 1,231 · cited 2×
“Nevertheless, the more sensitive correlational test revealed a significant positive relationship between reflective CRT responding and utilitarian judgment, consistent with Greene et al. (2001, 2004, 2008) and directly opposed to the alternative theory advanced by Kahane et al. (2012).”
Self-citationSerotonin selectively influences moral judgment and behavior through effects on harm aversion
Crockett, M. J., Clark, L., Hauser, M. D., & Robbins, T. W. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1009396107 · Cited by 526 · cited 2×
“, 2007), psychopharmacology (Crockett et al., 2010) and more traditional behavioral methods (Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006; Greene et al.”
Selective deficit in personal moral judgment following damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex
Ciaramelli, E., Muccioli, M., Làdavas, E., & di Pellegrino, G. (2007) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsm001 · Cited by 436 · cited 2×
“…have examined the cognitive and neural bases of moral judgment using neuroimaging (Greene et al., 2001, 2004), lesion methods (Mendez et al., 2005; Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007), psychopharmacology (Crockett et al., 2010) and more traditional behavioral methods (Valdesolo and…”
An Investigation of Moral Judgement in Frontotemporal Dementia
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“Researchers have examined the cognitive and neural bases of moral judgment using neuroimaging (Greene et al., 2001, 2004), lesion methods (Mendez et al., 2005; Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007), psychopharmacology (Crockett et al., 2010) and more traditional behavioral methods…”
Cited by
Beyond sacrificial harm: a two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Caviola, L., Faber, N. S., Crockett, M. J., & Savulescu, J. (2018) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000093 · Cited by 434
Baron, J., Scott, S., Fincher, K., & Emlen Metz, S. (2015) · Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.09.003 · Cited by 346
Reasoning supports utilitarian resolutions to moral dilemmas across diverse measures.
Patil, I., Zucchelli, M. M., Kool, W., Campbell, S., Fornasier, F., Calò, M., Silani, G., Cikara, M., & Cushman, F. (2021) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/pspp0000281 · Cited by 133
Byrd, N., & Conway, P. (2019) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2019.06.007 · Cited by 77
Sauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72
Metadata
- Authors
- Paxton, J. M., Bruni, T., & Greene, J. D.
- Venue
- Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-08-23
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 1368-1371
- ISSN
- 1749-5016 (ISSN-L)
- 1749-5024
- OpenAlex
- W2100206915
- Cited by
- 52
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 2.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Paxton, J. M., Bruni, T., & Greene, J. D. (2014). Are ‘counter-intuitive’ deontological judgments really counter-intuitive? An empirical reply to Kahane et al.(2012). Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nst102
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