The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse
Abstract
This accessible volume shines a light on how autocracy really works by providing basic facts about how post-World War II dictatorships achieve, retain, and lose power. The authors present an evidence-based portrait of key features of the authoritarian landscape with newly collected data about 200 dictatorial regimes. They examine the central political processes that shape the policy choices of dictatorships and how they compel reaction from policy makers in the rest of the world. Importantly, this book explains how some dictators concentrate great power in their own hands at the expense of other members of the dictatorial elite. Dictators who can monopolize decision making in their countries cause much of the erratic, warlike behavior that disturbs the rest of the world. By providing a picture of the central processes common to dictatorships, this book puts the experience of specific countries in perspective, leading to an informed understanding of events and the likely outcome of foreign responses to autocracies.
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Citations
Cites
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
McCubbins, M. D., & Schwartz, T. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110792 · Cited by 2,936
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Svolik, M. W. (2012) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139176040 · Cited by 2,611
Political Institutions under Dictatorship
Gandhi, J. (2008) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510090 · Cited by 1,910
Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats
Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2007) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414007305817 · Cited by 1,523
Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution
Kuran, T. (1989) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00116762 · Cited by 905
The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism
Pepinsky, T. (2014) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123413000021 · Cited by 511
The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa
Roessler, P. (2011) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887111000049 · Cited by 481
Cited by
Guriev, S., & Treisman, D. (2019) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.33.4.100 · Cited by 560
Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World
Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. (2021) · doi:10.1017/9781108957809 · Cited by 464
To Repress or to Co‐opt? Authoritarian Control in the Age of Digital Surveillance
Xu, X. (2021) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12514 · Cited by 316
Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
Meng, A. (2020) · doi:10.1017/9781108877497 · Cited by 215
A theory of informational autocracy
Guriev, S., & Treisman, D. (2020) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104158 · Cited by 205
Metadata
- Authors
- Geddes, B., Wright, J., & Frantz, E.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2018-07-31
- OpenAlex
- W3036312848
- Cited by
- 657
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 41.44
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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