Literal Meaning
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
According to the dominant position among philosophers of language today, we can legitimately ascribe determinate contents (such as truth-conditions) to natural language sentences, independently of what the speaker actually means. This view contrasts with that held by ordinary language philosophers fifty years ago: according to them, speech acts, not sentences, are the primary bearers of content. François Recanati argues for the relevance of this controversy to the current debate about semantics and pragmatics. Is 'what is said' (as opposed to merely implied) determined by linguistic conventions, or is it an aspect of 'speaker's meaning'? Do we need pragmatics to fix truth-conditions? What is 'literal meaning'? To what extent is semantic composition a creative process? How pervasive is context-sensitivity? Recanati provides an original and insightful defence of 'contextualism', and offers an informed survey of the spectrum of positions held by linguists and philosophers working at the semantics/pragmatics interface.
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Cites
Searle, J. R. (1969) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173438 · Cited by 11,718
Fodor, J. A. (1983) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4737.001.0001 · Cited by 7,734
Clark, H. H. (1996) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511620539 · Cited by 5,123
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
Millikan, R. G. (1984) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001 · Cited by 4,758
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
Searle, J. R. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173452 · Cited by 4,575
Searle, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5834.001.0001 · Cited by 3,595
Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature
Levinson, S. C. (2000) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5526.001.0001 · Cited by 2,404
Barsalou, L. W. (1983) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/bf03196968 · Cited by 1,879
Burge, T. (1993) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185680 · Cited by 929
Cited by
Assimakopoulos, S. (2026) · doi:10.1017/9781009378376 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Recanati, F.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2003-12-11
- OpenAlex
- W4211027406
- Cited by
- 240
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 21.46
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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