The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Humean Supervenience debugged
Abstract
Years ago, I wrote that much of my work could be seen in hindsight as a campaign on behalf of “Humean Supervenience”: the thesis that the whole truth about a world like ours supervens on the spatiotemporal distribution of local qualities (1986, pp. ix-xvi). I thought this campaign had been mostly successful. Despite some unfinished business with causation, especially the problem presented in Menzies (1989), I think so still. But I wrote that “There is one big bad bug: chance. It is here, and here alone, that I fear defeat” (1986, p. xiv). I think I can say at last how to beat the bug. But first I'll have to take a lot of time reviewing old ground. I'll reintroduce Humean Supervenience, with some afterthoughts. I'll say what a Humean analysis of chance might look like. I'll say why Humean analyses of chance are in bad trouble, and why unHumean analyses are not an acceptable refuge. I'll give the beginning of a solution to the problem that plagues Humean analyses, and I'll say why that beginning is not good enough. And then I'll come at last to the good news: thanks to a suggestion by Michael Thau, I think I know how to complete the solution. The resulting rescue of Humean chance won't give us all we might wish, but I think it gives us enough. So the key idea in this paper is Thau's. I thank him for kindly permitting me to use it here in my own way. But it can be used in other ways as well. Thau himself has not joined my campaign on behalf of Humean Supervenience.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Fraassen, B. C. V. (1989) · doi:10.1093/0198248601.001.0001 · Cited by 1,821
Cited by
(2002) · Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) · Cited by 421
Loewer, B. (2012) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9911-x · Cited by 324
Loewer, B. (2001) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics · doi:10.1016/s1355-2198(01)00028-4 · Cited by 286
Miller, E. (2015) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0351-7 · Cited by 125
Humean laws and circular explanation
Hicks, M. T., & van Elswyk, P. (2015) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0310-3 · Cited by 79
Nomothetic Explanation and Humeanism about Laws of Nature
Bhogal, H. (2020) · Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 12 · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893314.003.0006 · Cited by 74
Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature
Chen, E. K., & Goldstein, S. (2022) · Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-96775-8_2 · Cited by 69
An objective counterfactual theory of information
Cohen, J., & Meskin, A. (2006) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400600895821 · Cited by 63
Arntzenius, F., & Hall, N. (2003) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/54.2.171 · Cited by 59
The package deal account of laws and properties (PDA)
Loewer, B. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02765-2 · Cited by 55
Does the counterfactual theory of explanation apply to non-causal explanations in metaphysics?
Reutlinger, A. (2017) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-016-0155-z · Cited by 45
Noether's Theorems and Energy in General Relativity
De Haro, S. (2021) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2103.17160 · Cited by 44
Ismael, J. (1996) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/47.1.79 · Cited by 17
Against Pointillisme: A Call to Arms
Butterfield, J. (2011) · Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-1180-8_24 · Cited by 10
Gessell, B. (2017) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-017-9601-3 · Cited by 5
Capacities, explanation and the possibility of disunity
Hohwy, J. (2003) · International Studies in the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1080/0269859031000160630 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Venue
- Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1999-01-13
- Pages
- 224-247
- OpenAlex
- W2276360765
- Cited by
- 846
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 27.16
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.