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ToMM, ToBY, and Agency: Core architecture and domain specificity
Abstract
Our understanding of Agency is, in part, the result of domain-specific learning. The nature of this domain-specific learning needs to be understood in relation to the organization of information processing in the infant. As a result of adaptive evolution, the infant is a specialized processor of information with an architecture that (in part) reflects properties of the world. On this assumption, it should be possible to establish links between properties of the world, processing subsystems specialized for tracking those properties, and domains of knowledge. It is argued in the case of Agency that three main classes of world properties are reflected in three corresponding processing subsystems producing three distinct levels of knowledge. These three related triples are, respectively, mechanical Agency, actional Agency, and attitudinal Agency. Each of these three linked property classes, processing subsystems, and knowledge levels are discussed in turn but the focus will be mainly on mechanical Agency. In developing these ideas this discussion deals more generally with the nature of early mechanical understanding and its relation to conceptual development. A number of the ideas put forward in Leslie (1988) are revised and extended. One lesson of cognitive science is that different types of knowledge often have different locations within the global organization of human information processing. In development, different types of commonsense knowledge may originate from different locations in core cognitive architecture. Early mechanical understanding and the notion of Agency can be studied within such a framework.
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“Our findings suggest that the effect of social and ecological complexity may be limited to influencing more specialized, and potentially domain-specific forms of cognition (188-196).”
From The evolution of self-control. (2014) · cites this paper as [194]
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“Under Leslie’s model of ‘theory of mind’ development, the ability to engage in pretence together with the ability to recognize pretence in other people depends upon the mental state concept ‘pretend’ (Leslie, 1987, 1988, 1994a, 2000).”
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“…implicatures serves as an input to the semantic interpretation of a sentence.2 The module that is most relevant to the present work is the Theory of Mind module, whose workings were explored by Baron-Cohen (1995), Leslie (1994), Scholl and Leslie (1999), and Sperber and Wilson (2002), among others.”
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“This is because it is widely agreed among developmental psychologists that mindreading admits of two distinct varieties, which emerge at different points in the course of infant development (Wellman 1990 ; Leslie 1994 ; Baron-Cohen 1995 ; Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997 ; Song and Baillargeon 2008 ).”
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“…it has been argued that we possess innate representations of the principles of grammar (Pinker, 1994), physics (Carey and Spelke, 1994), mathematics (Wynn, 1992) and psychology (Leslie, 1994) Despite its theoretical utility, however, the positing of innate representations remains contentious.”
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“According to Leslie (1994, 1996), the capacity to reason about agents is based on a specific cognitive module.”
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“Although Leslie (1994a) does not make predictions about which of the mechanisms ToBY or ToMM1 would be impaired in autism, it is nevertheless reasonable to predict that the children with autism might not clearly distinguish agents from non-agents, i.e. show an impairment of ToBY, and that they…”
BackgroundInfluentialCognitive and Emotional Processes in the Cultural Transmission of Natural and Nonnatural Beliefs
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“…“theory of mind,” which entails, among other things, the attribution of beliefs and desires to people, and the appreciation that people may have false beliefs (Avis & Harris, 1991; Flavell, Zhang, Zou, Dong, & Qui, 1983; Gardner, Harris, Ohmoto, & Hamazaki, 1988; Leslie, 1994; Wellman, 1990).”
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“…such problems include how to: select a mate (Buss, 1992), speak and understand language (Pinker, 1994; Pinker and Bloom, 1990), engage in and reason about social exchange (Cosmides and Tooby, 1989, 1992), and explain and predict each other's behaviour (Baron-Cohen, 1995, 1999; Leslie, 1994).”
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“These findings suggest that infants do not simply perceptually distinguish self-moving from inert objects but also categorize them as ‘‘mechanical agents’’ ( Leslie, 1994 ).”
BackgroundInfluentialAdaptationism Carves Emotions at Their Functional Joints
Sznycer, D., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2017) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2017.1256132 · Cited by 62
“…& Tooby, 2008) are useless for reasoning about object mechanics, which is governed by a different system (Baillargeon, Li, Gertner & Wu, 2011; Leslie, 1994; Spelke, 1990); both coexist alongside systems specialized for reasoning about precautionary rules (Boyer & Lienard, 2006; Fiddck,…”
BackgroundBarratt, D., Rédei, A. C., Innes-Ker, Å. H., & van de Weijer, J. (2016) · Perception · doi:10.1177/0301006616638595 · Cited by 72
“The first of these, theory of mind, can be defined as the capacity to attribute mental and emotional states to an intentional agent (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Dennett, 1987; Leslie, 1994).”
BackgroundGergely, G. (2000) · Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association · doi:10.1177/00030651000480040801 · Cited by 64
Cordes, C. (2005) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.2005.11506778 · Cited by 65
Infants' individuation of agents and inert objects
Surian, L., & Caldi, S. (2009) · Developmental Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00873.x · Cited by 58
“…(e.g. Vuong & Tarr, 2004), but in the present context we should focus on some specific aspects of motion, namely those that reveal distinctive mechanical properties of the agents, such as the presence of internal sources of energy that cause a body to move (Leslie, 1994; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005).”
BackgroundInfluentialHow to Improve Bayesian Reasoning without Instruction
Gigerenzer, G. (2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195153729.003.0006 · Cited by 63
Autism: research into causes and intervention
Baron‐Cohen, S. (2004) · Developmental Neurorehabilitation · doi:10.1080/13638490310001654790 · Cited by 65
“natural way to make sense of agents (Baron-Cohen, 1994; Leslie, 1995; Premack,”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Leslie, A. M.
- Affiliations
- Medical Research Council (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Leslie, Alan M.
- ORCID
- Leslie, Alan M.
- Venue
- Mapping the Mind
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1994-04-29
- Pages
- 119-148
- OpenAlex
- W1709947398
- Cited by
- 1,105
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 41 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 65 · 2019: 33 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 46 · 2014: 23 · 2013: 30 · 2012: 37
- FWCI
- 31.02
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- agency, domain-specific learning, commonsense knowledge, conceptual development, TOMM, adaptive evolution, knowledge level
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