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ToMM, ToBY, and Agency: Core architecture and domain specificity
Abstract
Our understanding of Agency is, in part, the result of domain-specific learning. The nature of this domain-specific learning needs to be understood in relation to the organization of information processing in the infant. As a result of adaptive evolution, the infant is a specialized processor of information with an architecture that (in part) reflects properties of the world. On this assumption, it should be possible to establish links between properties of the world, processing subsystems specialized for tracking those properties, and domains of knowledge. It is argued in the case of Agency that three main classes of world properties are reflected in three corresponding processing subsystems producing three distinct levels of knowledge. These three related triples are, respectively, mechanical Agency, actional Agency, and attitudinal Agency. Each of these three linked property classes, processing subsystems, and knowledge levels are discussed in turn but the focus will be mainly on mechanical Agency. In developing these ideas this discussion deals more generally with the nature of early mechanical understanding and its relation to conceptual development. A number of the ideas put forward in Leslie (1988) are revised and extended. One lesson of cognitive science is that different types of knowledge often have different locations within the global organization of human information processing. In development, different types of commonsense knowledge may originate from different locations in core cognitive architecture. Early mechanical understanding and the notion of Agency can be studied within such a framework.
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“Our findings suggest that the effect of social and ecological complexity may be limited to influencing more specialized, and potentially domain-specific forms of cognition (188-196).”
From The evolution of self-control. (2014) · cites this paper as [194]
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“Experiments focusing on motivational states have revealed that even young infants can attribute dispositions and goals to others (e.g., Csibra, 2008; Csibra, Gergely, Bı́ró, Koós, & Brockbank, 1999; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Johnson, Ok, & Luo, 2007; Kamerawi, Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hiraki, 2005; Luo & Baillarg…”
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MethodInfants’ attribution of a goal to a morphologically unfamiliar agent
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“Leslie (1994) thought that it is necessary to have separate innate modules to handle causality, animacy, and theory of mind.”
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MethodKnowledge Enrichment and Conceptual Change in Folkbiology: Evidence from Williams Syndrome
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“Notable progress has been made in describing development in intuitive mechanics, psychology (theory of mind), biology, cosmology, and theory of matter (Au, 1994; Carey, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1995; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Hatano & Inagaki, 1994; Keil, 1989, 1994; Leslie, 1994; Perner, 1991; Spelke, 1991; Vosniadu & Brewer,…”
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“Some theorists (Fodor 1983; Leslie 1994, 1995; BaronCohen 1995; Carey & Spelke 1996; Johnson 2000; Scholl & Tremoulet 2000) have suggested that the selective use of low-level spatio-temporal information of the sort epitomized in temporally contingent interactions and facial configurations is…”
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“More generally, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 support the hypothesis that infants endow selfpropelled objects with an internal source of energy (e.g., Gelman, 1990; Gelman et al., 1995; Leslie, 1994; Leslie, 1995).”
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“…systems specialized for identifying intentional agents and/or for representing and interpreting actions as goal-directed (e.g., BaronCohen, 1994; Csibra & Gergely, 1998; Gergely & Csibra, 1997, 2003; Johnson, Slaughter, & Carey, 1998; Leslie, 1994, 1995; Premack, 1990; Premack & Premack, 1995).”
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BackgroundThe TARDIS Framework: Intelligent Virtual Agents for Social Coaching in Job Interviews
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“Numerous experiments suggest that there are domain-specific systems of knowledge for physics and psychology that are set in gear by theory-like algorithms (Leslie, 1994; Spelke, 1994; Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997).”
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“The 12-month-old infants in Experiment 3 looked reliably longer at the short- than at the tall-cover event, but those in Experiment 3A looked about equally at the two events. These results suggest that the infants (1) realized that the short object could be hidden under either cover, and that the tall object could be…”
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“We interpret others’ behavior by referring to their mental states such as goals, dispositions (e.g., preferences), perceptions, and beliefs (e.g., Carey & Spelke, 1994; Leslie, 1994; Premack & Premack, 1995; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005; Wellman, 1991).”
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“The ToM theory suggests that the deficit in pretend play seen in autism is a result of a deficit in the functioning of the metarepresentational aspect of the ToMM (see Leslie, 1987, 1994 ).”
BackgroundPreverbal Infants' Ability to Encode the Outcome of Distributive Actions
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Understandable robots - What, Why, and How
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Hamilton, A. F. D. C. (2009) · Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry · doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.2009.02098.x · Cited by 140
German, T. P., Niehaus, J. L., Roarty, M. P., Giesbrecht, B., & Miller, M. B. (2004) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/0898929042947892 · Cited by 129
“The proposition is ‘‘decoupled’’ from typical input – output relations so as to avoid confusion with ‘‘primary’’ representations of the real world (see Leslie, 1994b, for further discussion).”
BackgroundInfluentialMentalising, executive planning and disengagement in schizophrenia
Langdon, R. A., Coltheart, M., Ward, P. B., & Catts, S. V. (2001) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546800042000061 · Cited by 132
“…is not caused by selective damage to a domain-specific mentalising module (such as the Theory-of-Mind-Mechanism of Leslie and colleagues: Leslie, 1994a,b; Leslie & Roth, 1993; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992), but is instead caused by general difficulty entertaining any state of affairs that runs…”
BackgroundMethodProcedural and Declarative Knowledge
ten Berge, T., & Hezewijk, R. (1999) · Theory & Psychology · doi:10.1177/0959354399095002 · Cited by 150
Langdon, R. A., Coltheart, M., & Ward, P. B. (2006) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546800444000218 · Cited by 130
“…depends on the development and on-line capacity of a cognitive mechanism dedicated to representing epistemic mental states (beliefs and intentions rather than percepts and emotions) and that this cognitive mechanism fails to develop normally in autism (see, e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1994).”
BackgroundPyysiäinen, I. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195380026.001.0001 · Cited by 129
Empathizing: neurocognitive developmental mechanisms and individual differences
Chakrabarti, B., & Baron‐Cohen, S. (2006) · Progress in brain research · doi:10.1016/s0079-6123(06)56022-4 · Cited by 136
“And where ToMM employs M-Representations 1 (Leslie 1995) of the form Agent-attitude-proposition (e.g., Mother – believes -Johnny – took-the -cookie), TESS employs a new class of representations, which we can all E- Representations 2 of the form Self-Affective state-[Self-Affective…”
MethodAdaptations to Predators and Prey
Barrett, H. C. (2015) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781119125563.evpsych109 · Cited by 127
Wellman, H. M. (2010) · doi:10.1002/9781444325485.ch10 · Cited by 151
Do infants and nonhuman animals attribute mental states?
Burge, T. (2018) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000091 · Cited by 160
“By contrast, several psychologists laudably avoid inferring directly from attribution of action to attribution of mentality (Gergely et al. 1995; Leslie, 1994; Woodward, 1998).”
BackgroundCheng, Y., Chiang, H.-C., Ye, J., & Cheng, L.-H. (2010) · Computers & Education · doi:10.1016/j.compedu.2010.06.008 · Cited by 134
Ybarra, O. (2002) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.128.3.421 · Cited by 128
“In addition, the human mind seems to be innately prepared to learn to seek agency in animate objects (i.e., other humans—e.g., Leslie, 1994; Wellman, 1990).”
BackgroundRoots of a social brain: Developmental models of emerging animacy-detection mechanisms
Rosa Salva, O., Mayer, U., & Vallortigara, G. (2015) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.12.015 · Cited by 123
A Theory of Autobiographical Memory: Necessary Components and Disorders Resulting from their Loss
Klein, S. B., German, T. P., Cosmides, L., & Gabriel, R. H. (2004) · Social Cognition · doi:10.1521/soco.22.5.460.50765 · Cited by 121
Metadata
- Authors
- Leslie, A. M.
- Affiliations
- Medical Research Council (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Leslie, Alan M.
- ORCID
- Leslie, Alan M.
- Venue
- Mapping the Mind
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1994-04-29
- Pages
- 119-148
- OpenAlex
- W1709947398
- Cited by
- 1,105
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 41 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 65 · 2019: 33 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 46 · 2014: 23 · 2013: 30 · 2012: 37
- FWCI
- 31.02
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- agency, domain-specific learning, commonsense knowledge, conceptual development, TOMM, adaptive evolution, knowledge level
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