Above Politics: Bureaucratic Discretion and Credible Commitment
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Economic development requires secure contract enforcement and stable property rights. Normal majority-rule politics, such as bargaining over distributive and monetary policies, generate instability and frequently undermine economic development. Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy. Even more compelling is professionalism, which embeds its professional practitioners in professional norms and culture, and incidentally mitigates corruption. Financial examples are provided throughout the book, which ends with an analysis of the role played by professionalized bureaucracies during the Great Recession.
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Cites
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Cited by
Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
Meng, A. (2020) · doi:10.1017/9781108877497 · Cited by 215
The strongman presidency and the two logics of presidential power
Howell, W. G., & Moe, T. M. (2023) · Presidential Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/psq.12830 · Cited by 29
Metadata
- Authors
- Miller, G. J., & Whitford, A. B.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2016-02-29
- OpenAlex
- W4231715386
- Cited by
- 174
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 9.29
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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