Cited by 1,585Management Theory and PracticeEmployee Performance and MotivationAccounting and Organizational Management

On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B

Kerr, S.·1975·Academy of Management Journal

Abstract

Illustrations are presented from society in general, and from organizations in particular, of reward systems that “pay off” for one behavior even though the rewarder hopes dearly for another. Porti...

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2307/255378

Cites

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • It is well known from practice and theory that explicit performance incentives may be harmful because they induce employees to concentrate only on rewarded tasks and neglect non-rewarded tasks.

    “It is well known from practice (Kerr 1975) and from theory (Holmström and Milgrom 1991, Baker 1992) that in this situation explicit performance incentives may be harmful because they induce the employees to concentrate only on the rewarded tasks and to neglect the non-rewarded tasks.”

    From Psychological foundations of incentives (2002) · cites this paper as Kerr 1975

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Kerr, S.
Corresponding author
Kerr, S.
Venue
Academy of Management Journal
Published
1975-12-01
Volume
18
Issue
4
Pages
769-783
ISSN
  • 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
  • 1948-0989
OpenAlex
W2174179791
Cited by
1,585
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 49 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 49 · 2023: 28 · 2022: 29 · 2021: 33 · 2020: 64 · 2019: 38 · 2018: 45 · 2017: 53 · 2016: 53 · 2015: 53 · 2014: 55 · 2013: 68 · 2012: 93
FWCI
3.84
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Academy of Management Journal (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Management Theory and Practice
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Employee Performance and Motivation
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management Information Systems › Accounting and Organizational Management
Keywords
reward systems, performance-based pay, unintended consequences, organizational incentives, employee motivation, reward function design
MeSH terms
Commerce, Insurance, Health, Organization and Administration, Politics, Rehabilitation Centers, Reward, Universities, Warfare

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review