The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Justification and the Truth-Connection
Abstract
The internalism-externalism debate is one of the oldest debates in epistemology. Internalists assert that the justification of our beliefs can only depend on facts internal to us, while externalists insist that justification can depend on additional, for example environmental, factors. In this book Clayton Littlejohn proposes and defends a new strategy for resolving this debate. Focussing on the connections between practical and theoretical reason, he explores the question of whether the priority of the good to the right (in ethics) might be used to defend an epistemological version of consequentialism, and proceeds to formulate a new 'deontological externalist' view. His discussion is rich with insights and will be valuable for a wide range of readers in epistemology, ethics and practical reason.
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Citations
Cites
The Humean Theory of Motivation
SMITH, M. (1987) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/xcvi.381.36 · Cited by 1,005
The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays
Shoemaker, S. (1996) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511624674 · Cited by 934
Wedgwood, R. (2002) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/1468-0068.36.s16.10 · Cited by 279
Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology
Goldman, A. I. (1993) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.2307/1522948 · Cited by 170
Cited by
Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law
Littlejohn, C. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1608-4 · Cited by 95
Self-citationKnowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief
Whiting, D. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01905-z · Cited by 34
Metadata
- Authors
- Littlejohn, C.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2012-06-07
- OpenAlex
- W1548244421
- Cited by
- 530
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 24.84
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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