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Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems
Abstract
Popular elections are at the heart of representative democracy. Thus, understanding the laws and practices that govern such elections is essential to understanding modern democracy. In this book, Cox views electoral laws as posing a variety of coordination problems that political forces must solve. Coordination problems - and with them the necessity of negotiating withdrawals, strategic voting, and other species of strategic coordination - arise in all electoral systems. This book employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws. This book also considers not just what happens when political forces succeed in solving the coordination problems inherent in the electoral system they face but also what happens when they fail.
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“Second, mass polarization in terms of partisan alignment (Fig. 1b) focuses on the dimensionality of the political space.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [64]
In the citing paper
“Por tanto, el número de candidatos es un aspecto clave en la lógica de la coordinación estratégica en el plano electoral (Cox 1997).”
From EL COSTO DE COORDINAR: NÚMERO DE CANDIDATOS PRESIDENCIALES EN AMÉRICA LATINA 1993-2010 (2017) · cites this paper as Cox 1997
In the citing paper
“Por una parte, cuando la presidencia es un “gran premio”, esto puede incentivar la conformación de pocos partidos legislativos que se organicen en torno a la disputa presidencial (Shugart y Carey 1992;Jones 1995;Cox 1997;Mainwaring y Shugart 1997;Golder 2006).”
From EL COSTO DE COORDINAR: NÚMERO DE CANDIDATOS PRESIDENCIALES EN AMÉRICA LATINA 1993-2010 (2017) · cites this paper as Cox 1997
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Sheng, E. C. J. (2007) · Journal of East Asian Studies · doi:10.1017/s1598240800008742 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Cox, G. W.
- Affiliations
- University of California San Diego (US)
- Corresponding author
- Cox, Gary W.
- ORCID
- Cox, Gary W.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1997-03-28
- OpenAlex
- W4251366449
- Cited by
- 2,281
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 87 · 2025: 119 · 2024: 74 · 2023: 56 · 2022: 68 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 116 · 2019: 125 · 2018: 102 · 2017: 96 · 2016: 105 · 2015: 93 · 2014: 82 · 2013: 93 · 2012: 62
- FWCI
- 75.68
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
- Keywords
- electoral systems, electoral law, strategic voting, coordination problems, strategic coordination, game-theoretic model, voting behavior, representative democracy
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