Value extremity contributes to affective polarization in the US
Abstract
A wealth of research documents the rise of affective polarization, or the increasing disdain for the out-party in American politics. In this paper, we analyze ANES data from 1988 to 2016 to investigate the contribution of core value polarization to the phenomenon of out-party enmity. We find that greater differences in fundamental principles relate significantly to emotionally intense evaluations of the opposing party and its candidates, as well as the ideological out-group, independent of issue attitude extremity and the strength of one's partisan and ideological identities. Moreover, ANES panel data from 1992 to 1996 reveal that past value extremity promotes future affective polarization. These results are important for our understanding of the nature and extent of value-based polarization in American politics.
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Polarization on values in the first wave of a survey predicted affective polarization four years later, adjusting for value polarization during the second wave.
“In another research programme, polarization on values in the first wave of a survey predicted affective polarization four years later, adjusting for value polarization during the second wave82.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [82]
Longitudinal research demonstrated that ideological consistency at time 1 predicted affective polarization at time 2, and affective polarization at time 1 predicted ideological consistency at time 2, all other things being equal.
“Moreover, longitudinal research demonstrated that ideological consistency at time 1 predicted affective polarization at time 2, and affective polarization at time 1 predicted ideological consistency at time 2, all other things being equal82,87.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [82]
Individuals who identify as more liberal and endorse more leftist attitudes place a higher value on equality and progressive forms of social change than those who identify as more conservative and rightist.
“By contrast, those who identify as more liberal and endorse more leftist attitudes place a higher value on equality and progressive forms of social change43,47,82,107,171–173.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [82]
Individuals who identify as more conservative and endorse more rightist attitudes place a higher value on tradition, social order and stability, and the maintenance of existing hierarchical social arrangements than those who identify as more liberal and leftist.
“those who identify as more conservative and endorse more rightist attitudes place a higher value on tradition, social order and stability, and the maintenance of existing hierarchical social arrangements.”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [82]
Cites
The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States
Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034 · Cited by 3,317 · see citing works
Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfs038 · Cited by 2,748 · see citing works
Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization
Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12152 · Cited by 2,452 · see citing works
How Ideology Fuels Affective Polarization
Rogowski, J. C., & Sutherland, J. L. (2016) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-015-9323-7 · Cited by 503 · see citing works
The Polarization of Contemporary American Politics
Hare, C., & Poole, K. T. (2014) · Polity · doi:10.1057/pol.2014.10 · Cited by 247 · see citing works
Affective Polarization and Ideological Sorting: A Reciprocal, Albeit Weak, Relationship
Lelkes, Y. (2018) · The Forum · doi:10.1515/for-2018-0005 · Cited by 132 · see citing works
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Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts
Jost, J. T., Baldassarri, D. S., & Druckman, J. N. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-022-00093-5 · Cited by 276 · see citing works
Reducing affective polarization: Warm group relations or policy compromise?
Huddy, L., & Yair, O. (2021) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12699 · Cited by 124 · see citing works
- Authors
- Enders, A. M., & Lupton, R. N.
- Affiliations
- University of Louisville (US)
- University of Connecticut (US)
- Corresponding author
- Lupton, Robert N.
- Venue
- Political Science Research and Methods
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2020-06-22
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 857-866
- ISSN
- 2049-8470 (ISSN-L)
- 2049-8489
- OpenAlex
- W3036603038
- Cited by
- 48
- References
- 6
- Citations by year
- 2026: 17 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 1
- FWCI
- 16.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Political Science Research and Methods (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Keywords
- affective polarization, partisan hostility, partisan identity, ideological identity, American politics
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