The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Credible Commitment and Property Rights: Evidence from Russia
Abstract
Few dispute that secure property rights are critical to economic development. But if secure property rights are so beneficial, then why are they so rare? More precisely, what factors promote secure property rights? Do rightholders view private or state agents as a greater threat to property? Do they value bureaucratic commitment or discretion? I use evidence from two original surveys of company managers in Russia to assess the institutional, social, and political determinants of secure property rights. Most managers said that state arbitration courts did not work badly in disputes with other businesses, but few expected these courts to protect their rights in disputes with state officials. More importantly, managers who expressed confidence that state arbitration courts could constrain state officials invested at higher rates, even controlling for the perceived effectiveness of state institutions. Ironically, increasing constraints on state agents can increase the security of property and bolster state capacity. These results generate insights into debates on the role of state in the economy, the origins of secure property rights, the nature of state capacity, the importance of informal institutions, and the process of legal reform.
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Cites
The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.5.1369 · Cited by 8,517 · cited 1×
“Second, many argue that effective institutions - broadly understood - are related to the security of property rights, but we have little knowledge about which specific institutions are especially important (Acemoglu et al. 2001).”
BackgroundNorth, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009451 · Cited by 5,300
Johnson, S., McMillan, J., & Woodruff, C. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024539 · Cited by 980
Cited by
Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment
Li, Q. (2009) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414009331723 · Cited by 400
Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment
JOHNS, L., & WELLHAUSEN, R. L. (2016) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305541500057x · Cited by 185
“Yet it is often difficult for foreign investors to secure compensation for contract breach, whether in a domestic or an international legal body (Frye 2004; Johnston 2013; Lowenfeld 2008).”
The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment in Authoritarian Regimes
Bastiaens, I. (2016) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2015.1065699 · Cited by 29
Metadata
- Authors
- FRYE, T.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2004-08
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 453-466
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2120616985
- Cited by
- 203
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 18.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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