The DOI matches its Crossref record; 67 of the 67 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution
Abstract
Inequality and democracy are far more compatible empirically than social conflict theory predicts. This article speaks to this puzzle, identifying the scope conditions under which democratization induces greater redistribution. Because autocrats sometimes have incentives to expropriate economic elites, who lack reliable institutions to protect their rights, elites may prefer democracy to autocratic rule if they can impose roadblocks to redistribution under democracy ex ante. Using global panel data (1972–2008), this study finds that there is a relationship between democracy and redistribution only if elites are politically weak during a transition; for example, when there is revolutionary pressure. Redistribution is also greater if a democratic regime can avoid adopting and operating under a constitution written by outgoing elites and instead create a new constitution that redefines the political game. This finding holds across three different measures of redistribution and instrumental variables estimation. This article also documents the ways in which elites ‘bias’ democratic institutions.
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“Autocrats may be well positioned to capture state resources at the time of democratic transition, which they can then use in a clientelistic fashion to stay in power (Brun and Diamond 2014; Haggard and Kaufmann 2016; Albertus and Menaldo 2014).”
From Accountability by Numbers: A New Global Transitional Justice Dataset (1946–2016) (2020) · cites this paper as Albertus and Menaldo 2014
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Metadata
- Authors
- Albertus, M., & Menaldo, V.
- Corresponding author
- Albertus, Michael
- Venue
- British Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2013-05-23
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 575-603
- ISSN
- 0007-1234 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-2112
- OpenAlex
- W3121603570
- Cited by
- 242
- References
- 67
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 29 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 37 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 58 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 4
- FWCI
- 28.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- British Journal of Political Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Natural Resources and Economic Development
- Keywords
- democratization, redistribution, economic elites, elite dominance, political transition, authoritarian regimes, expropriation, constitutional drafting, democratic institutions, social conflict theory
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