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Interests, Norms and Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Case of Climate Co-operation
Open accessAbstract
Mitigating climate change requires countries to provide a global public good. This means that the domestic cleavages underlying mass attitudes toward international climate policy are a central determinant of its provision. We argue that the industry-specific costs of emission abatement and internalized social norms help explain support for climate policy. To evaluate our predictions we develop novel measures of industry-specific interests by cross-referencing individuals’ sectors of employment and objective industry-level pollution data and employing quasi-behavioral measures of social norms in combination with both correlational and conjoint-experimental data. We find that individuals working in pollutive industries are 7 percentage points less likely to support climate co-operation than individuals employed in cleaner sectors. Our results also suggest that reciprocal and altruistic individuals are about 10 percentage points more supportive of global climate policy. These findings indicate that both interests and norms function as complementary explanations that improve our understanding of individual policy preferences.
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Measuring Subgroup Preferences in Conjoint Experiments
Leeper, T. J., Hobolt, S. B., & Tilley, J. (2020) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1017/pan.2019.30 · Cited by 846
Right-wing populism and the climate change agenda: exploring the linkages
Lockwood, M. (2018) · Environmental Politics · doi:10.1080/09644016.2018.1458411 · Cited by 666
De Vries, C. E., Hobolt, S. B., & Walter, S. (2021) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818320000491 · Cited by 338
Does Conjoint Analysis Mitigate Social Desirability Bias?
Horiuchi, Y., Markovich, Z., & Yamamoto, T. (2022) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1017/pan.2021.30 · Cited by 277
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Ehret, S. (2022) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501763.2022.2094988 · Cited by 28
Metadata
- Authors
- Bechtel, M. M., Genovese, F., & Scheve, K. F.
- Venue
- British Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2017-07-11
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1333-1355
- ISSN
- 0007-1234 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-2112
- OpenAlex
- W3125505526
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 15.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Bechtel, M. M., Genovese, F., & Scheve, K. F. (2019). Interests, Norms and Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Case of Climate Co-operation. British Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123417000205
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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