Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists
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Experimental games turned out to be remarkably productive tools for examining the nature of social preferences and social norms. This paper describes the methods and tools of experimental game theory and provides a selection of games that have been useful. We also discuss the role of evolutionary explanations of and social preference theory in organizing the data in a coherent way.
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Cites
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,416 · see citing works
Self-citationCollective action and the evolution of social norms.
Ostrom, E. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.137 · Cited by 4,195 · see citing works
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Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador
Wood, E. J. (2003) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808685 · Cited by 1,644 · see citing works
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2002) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00027 · Cited by 1,061 · see citing works
Self-citationPersonality Psychology and Economics
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Promoting cooperation in the field
Kraft-Todd, G., Yoeli, E., Bhanot, S., & Rand, D. (2015) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2015.02.006 · Cited by 178 · see citing works
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Trust and Community in Open Source Software Production
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Testing the social competition hypothesis of depression using a simple economic game
Kupferberg, A., Hager, O. M., Fischbacher, U., Brändle, L. S., Haynes, M., & Hasler, G. (2016) · BJPsych Open · doi:10.1192/bjpo.bp.115.001362 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
- Authors
- Camerer, C. F., & Fehr, E.
- Affiliations
- California Institute of Technology (US)
- University of Zurich (CH)
- Venue
- Foundations of Human Sociality
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2004-03-25
- Pages
- 55-95
- OpenAlex
- W2100185167
- Cited by
- 465
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 33 · 2019: 18 · 2018: 16 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 24 · 2014: 25 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 19
- FWCI
- 67.04
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.zora.uzh.ch
- Licence
- other-oa
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (acceptedVersion)
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Repository for Publications and Research Data (ETH Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- ETH Zürich Research Collection
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (9730364, 0078911)
- John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- social norms, social preferences, experimental games, game theory, evolutionary explanation
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