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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY

Open access
Chesterman, Simon · 2020 · International and Comparative Law Quarterly

Abstract

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems become more sophisticated and play a larger role in society, arguments that they should have some form of legal personality gain credence. The arguments are typically framed in instrumental terms, with comparisons to juridical persons such as corporations. Implicit in those arguments, or explicit in their illustrations and examples, is the idea that as AI systems approach the point of indistinguishability from humans they should be entitled to a status comparable to natural persons. This article contends that although most legal systems could create a novel category of legal persons, such arguments are insufficient to show that they should.

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Crossref · 10.1017/s0020589320000366

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Metadata

Authors
Chesterman, S.
Venue
International and Comparative Law Quarterly
Published
2020-09-21
Volume
69
Issue
4
Pages
819-844
ISSN
  • 0020-5893 (ISSN-L)
  • 1471-6895
OpenAlex
W3082392861
Cited by
232
References
9
FWCI
106.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
hybrid

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0020589320000366
The paper
Chesterman, S. (2020). ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY. International and Comparative Law Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020589320000366

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.