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Regime design matters: intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance
Abstract
Whether a treaty elicits compliance from governments or nonstate actors depends upon identifiable characteristics of the regime's compliance systems. Within the international regime controlling intentional oil pollution, a provision requiring tanker owners to install specified equipment produced dramatically higher levels of compliance than a provision requiring tanker operators to limit their discharges. Since both provisions entailed strong economic incentives for violation and regulated the same countries over the same time period, the variance in compliance clearly can be attributed to different features of the two subregimes. The equipment requirements' success stemmed from establishing an integrated compliance system that increased transparency, provided for potent and credible sanctions, reduced implementation costs to governments by building on existing infrastructures, and prevented violations rather than merely deterring them.
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Cites
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
Why are some international agreements informal?
Lipson, C. (1991) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033191 · Cited by 585
Cited by
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?
Downs, G. W., Rocke, D. M., & Barsoom, P. N. (1996) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033427 · Cited by 1,540
The Promise of Institutionalist Theory
Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. (1995) · International Security · doi:10.2307/2539214 · Cited by 1,202
Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet
Victor, D. G. (2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511975714 · Cited by 585
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Simmons, B. A. (1998) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.75 · Cited by 583
The Study of International Regimes
LEVY, M. A., YOUNG, O. R., & ZÜRN, M. (1995) · European Journal of International Relations · doi:10.1177/1354066195001003001 · Cited by 421
Metadata
- Authors
- Mitchell, R. B.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1994
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 425-458
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W1964584173
- Cited by
- 357
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 24.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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