The DOI matches its Crossref record; 86 of the 86 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition
Abstract
Despite their presumed liabilities, institutions associated with democracy serve as a source of power in prolonged international competition by increasing the financial resources that states can bring to bear. The theory of sovereign debt suggests that a state's ability to raise money through public borrowing is enhanced when debtholders have mechanisms for sanctioning state leaders in the event of default. Institutions associated with liberal government provide such mechanisms. All other things being equal, states that possess these institutions enjoy superior access to credit and lower interest rates than do states in which the sovereign has more discretion to default unilaterally. Liberal states can not only raise more money from a given economic base but can also pursue tax-smoothing policies that minimize economic distortions. The ability to finance competition in a manner that is consistent with long-term economic growth generates a significant advantage in prolonged rivalries. These claims are explored by analyzing the Anglo-French rivalry (1688–1815) and the Cold War.
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The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1218 · Cited by 1,637
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The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2007) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13028 · Cited by 466
The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We?
Haggard, S., & Tiede, L. (2011) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.10.007 · Cited by 399
The Rule of Law and Economic Development
Haggard, S., MacIntyre, A., & Tiede, L. (2008) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.081205.100244 · Cited by 365
Metadata
- Authors
- Schultz, K. A., & Weingast, B. R.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2003
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-42
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2139437648
- Cited by
- 376
- References
- 86
- FWCI
- 19.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.