Institutional versus Individual Investment in IPOs: The Importance of Firm Fundamentals
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 62 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Consistent with institutions having an advantage over individuals, we find that newly public firms with the highest levels of institutional investment significantly outperform those with the lowest levels. While prior literature has attributed much of institutions’ higher returns around various corporate events to private information, we find that much of the difference simply reflects better interpretation of readily available public information. Individuals disproportionately invest in the types of firms that earn significantly lower abnormal returns over the long run. Individuals either disregard or misinterpret the relevance of readily available public information, and as a result, they bear the brunt of IPO underperformance.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationHot Markets, Investor Sentiment, and IPO Pricing*
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InfluentialStocks are special too: an analysis of the equity lending market
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InfluentialThe Expiration of IPO Share Lockups
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Self-citationTakeover Defenses of IPO Firms
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Self-citationWho underreacts to cash-flow news? evidence from trading between individuals and institutions
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The role of institutional investors in seasoned equity offerings
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Allocation of initial public offerings and flipping activity
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InfluentialCook, D. O., Kieschnick, R., & Van Ness, R. A. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.08.005 · Cited by 253 · cited 1×
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Do Institutions Receive Favorable Allocations in IPOs with Better Long-Run Returns?
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Cited by
The Long-Run Role of the Media: Evidence from Initial Public Offerings
Liu, L. X., Sherman, A. E., & Zhang, Y. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2013.1851 · Cited by 231
Chung, C. Y., Lee, J., & Park, J. (2014) · Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies · doi:10.1111/ajfs.12043 · Cited by 19
Metadata
- Authors
- Field, L. C., & Lowry, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2009-06
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 489-516
- ISSN
- 0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
- 1756-6916
- OpenAlex
- W3123009430
- Cited by
- 218
- References
- 62
- FWCI
- 20.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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