The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate Governance and Innovation: Theory and Evidence
Abstract
We develop a theory to show how external and internal corporate governance mechanisms affect innovation. We predict a U-shaped relation between innovation and external takeover pressure, which arises from the interaction between expected takeover premia and private benefits of control. Using ex ante and ex post innovation measures, we find strong empirical support for the predicted relation. We exploit the variation in takeover pressure created by the passage of antitakeover laws across different states. Innovation is fostered either by an unhindered market for corporate control or by antitakeover laws that are severe enough to effectively deter takeovers.
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Citations
Cites
Legal Determinants of External Finance
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x · Cited by 9,783
Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848 · cited 2×
“(X ; w (QX)) argmax X; w(QX) E[QX w(QX)] (18)”
BackgroundCorporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/376950 · Cited by 3,777
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia
Stein, J. C. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261524 · Cited by 1,673
Cited by
Recent Developments in the Econometrics of Program Evaluation
Imbens, G. W., & Wooldridge, J. M. (2009) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.47.1.5 · Cited by 4,926
Corporate governance and green innovation
Amore, M. D., & Bennedsen, M. (2016) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2015.11.003 · Cited by 948
Credit supply and corporate innovation
Amore, M. D., Schneider, C., & Žaldokas, A. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.04.006 · Cited by 824
Independent boards and innovation
Balsmeier, B., Fleming, L., & Manso, G. (2017) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.12.005 · Cited by 797
What Affects Innovation More: Policy or Policy Uncertainty?
Bhattacharya, U., Hsu, P.-H., Tian, X., & Xu, Y. (2017) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109017000540 · Cited by 648
Metadata
- Authors
- Sapra, H., Subramanian, A., & Subramanian, K. V.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2014-08
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 957-1003
- ISSN
- 0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
- 1756-6916
- OpenAlex
- W3124621061
- Cited by
- 241
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 69.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Sapra, H., Subramanian, A., & Subramanian, K. V. (2014). Corporate Governance and Innovation: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1017/s002210901400060x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.