The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Reasons we can Share: An Attack on the Distinction between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values
Open accessAbstract
To later generations, much of the moral philosophy of the twentieth century will look like a struggle to escape from utilitarianism. We seem to succeed in disproving one utilitarian doctrine, only to find ourselves caught in the grip of another. I believe that this is because a basic feature of the consequentialist outlook still pervades and distorts our thinking: the view that the business of morality is to bring something about. Too often, the rest of us have pitched our protests as if we were merely objecting to the utilitarian account of what the moral agent ought to bring about or how he ought to do it. Deontological considerations have been characterized as “side constraints,” as if they were essentially restrictions on ways to realize ends. More importantly, moral philosophers have persistently assumed that the primal scene of morality is a scene in which someone does something to or for someone else. This is the same mistake that children make about another primal scene. The primal scene of morality, I will argue, is not one in which I do something to you or you do something to me, but one in which we do something together. The subject matter of morality is not what we should bring about, but how we should relate to one another. If only Rawls has succeeded in escaping utilitarianism, it is because only Rawls has fully grasped this point. His primal scene, the original position, is one in which a group of people must make a decision together. Their task is to find the reasons they can share.
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Cites
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Cited by
Dancy, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0199270023.001.0001 · Cited by 1,677
Practical Intelligence and the Virtues
Russell, D. C. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565795.001.0001 · Cited by 582
Ruger, J. P. (2004) · The Lancet · doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(04)17064-5 · Cited by 465
VULNERABILITY IN RESEARCH AND HEALTH CARE; DESCRIBING THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM?
HURST, S. A. (2008) · Bioethics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00631.x · Cited by 409
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions
Berker, S. (2013) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2087645 · Cited by 336
Metadata
- Authors
- Korsgaard, C. M.
- Venue
- Social Philosophy and Policy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1993
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 24-51
- ISSN
- 0265-0525 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-6437
- OpenAlex
- W2124303882
- Cited by
- 257
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 66.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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