How Could We Know When a Robot was a Moral Patient?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
There is growing interest in machine ethics in the question of whether and under what circumstances an artificial intelligence would deserve moral consideration. This paper explores a particular type of moral status that the author terms psychological moral patiency, focusing on the epistemological question of what sort of evidence might lead us to reasonably conclude that a given artificial system qualified as having this status. The paper surveys five possible criteria that might be applied: intuitive judgments, assessments of intelligence, the presence of desires and autonomous behavior, evidence of sentience, and behavioral equivalence. The author suggests that despite its limitations, the latter approach offers the best way forward, and defends a variant of that, termed the cognitive equivalence strategy. In short, this holds that an artificial system should be considered a psychological moral patient to the extent that it possesses cognitive mechanisms shared with other beings such as nonhuman animals whom we also consider to be psychological moral patients.
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Citations
Cites
Detecting awareness in the vegetative state
Owen, A. M., Coleman, M. R., Boly, M., Davis, M. H., Laureys, S., & Pickard, J. D. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1130197 · Cited by 1,978
On Defining Artificial Intelligence
Wang, P. (2019) · Journal of Artificial General Intelligence · doi:10.2478/jagi-2019-0002 · Cited by 740
The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines
Selbst, A. D., & Barocas, S. (2018) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3126971 · Cited by 392
The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis
Chalmers, D. J. (2016) · Science Fiction and Philosophy · doi:10.1002/9781118922590.ch16 · Cited by 246 · cited 2×
“10,11 For its part, the second position is vulnerable to the charge of “ speciesism ” (in the sense of Peter Singer, e.g., 2009 12 ).”
BackgroundBasl, J. (2014) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-013-0122-y · Cited by 51
How to Treat Machines that Might Have Minds
Agar, N. (2020) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-019-00357-8 · Cited by 33 · cited 1×
“I argued that Danaher ’ s behavioral equivalence strategy offered a promising path forward, but offered a somewhat different formulation of the view in terms of cognitive equivalence that I believe overcomes some of its limitations.”
Cited by
Anthropomorphism in AI: hype and fallacy
Placani, A. (2024) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-024-00419-4 · Cited by 170
Eight Things to Know about Large Language Models
Bowman, S. R. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2304.00612 · Cited by 137
The Measurement Problem of Consciousness
Browning, H., Veit, W., & University of Arkansas Press (2020) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics20204815 · Cited by 78
Understanding artificial agency
Dung, L. (2025) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqae010 · Cited by 69
“This concerns particularly two questions: First, there is a recent debate on robot rights and the moral status of AI systems (Gunkel 2018; Ladak 2023; Moosavi 2023; Müller 2021; Schwitzgebel and Garza 2015; Shevlin 2021).”
BackgroundLong, R., Sebo, J., Butlin, P., Finlinson, K., Fish, K., Harding, J., Pfau, J., Sims, T., Birch, J., & Chalmers, D. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2411.00986 · Cited by 27
Metadata
- Authors
- Shevlin, H.
- Venue
- Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2021-06-10
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 459-471
- ISSN
- 0963-1801 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-2147
- OpenAlex
- W3173106049
- Cited by
- 55
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 22.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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